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ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER: A SURVEY OF
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN 1975*
STEPHEN M. EGE**
We are now well into the computer era, which came of age some-
time following the close of the Second World War.' Consumers' will
soon see evidence of the computer's handiwork or, as it is called in the
trade, information processing systems applications, in settings more
intimately connected with their life styles, such as the purchase of
consumables.
The supermarket industry has begun installing in several pilot
locations a checkout counter that, using a laser beam scanner, will
read a pattern of bars imprinted on every food item sold. The in-
formation will be fed into a central processing unit located in the
store or in a central location in a metropolitan area. This unit will,
in turn, relay identifying and pricing data to the checkout counter,
where a device will then print a description of the item and its price
on a paper tape that the customer will receive with his purchase. The
operation will have much the same appearance as it does at present,
* Copyright © 1975 by Stephen M. Ege.
** A.B., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of Chicago. Member of the District of
Columbia bar. Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank
Board.
I received research and editorial assistance in the preparation of this article
from Steven I. Klein, third year student, University of Maryland School of Law. I
also received much helpful criticism from attorneys in other federal regulatory agen-
cies. The views expressed in this article, however, are my own and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Board, staff, or those who reviewed this article.
1. N. WIENER, CYBERNErICS (1948), heralds the on-coming.
2. In England the general population is still composed, in part, of "customers"
rather than those whose principal public aspect seems to be one of ingestion. The
author, nevertheless, will bow to the current fashion and refer to the general public
as "consumers."
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except that the checker will only pass items over the scanner, leaving
the machine to ring up the price.'
But behind every purchase there is, of course, a payment. Finan-
cial institutions have made significant efforts to reduce the costs of
processing payments.' In 1968 two clearing house associations formed
a Special Committee on Paperless Entries (SCOPE) to develop an
automated clearing house for San Francisco and Los Angeles. In that
same year the major banking trade group, the American Bankers
Association, formed a committee on Monetary and Payment Systems
(MAPS) to study the paper check clearing problem. In 1970 a
study commissioned by that group concluded that the present check
collection system was adequate until the 1980's.' Nevertheless, the
implications of the rising flood of paper were evident to many. The
example of the back office problems of the securities industry, too,
cannot have been lost on policy makers. In 1971 MAPS released a
report calling for the establishment of regional automated clearing
houses, and during the same period the Federal Reserve issued a call
for improvement in the payments mechanism.6 Also in that year, a
group of Atlanta banks, including the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank,
began to study the possibility of forming an automated clearing house
in Atlanta.
7
3. In this system the price stamp is an irrelevant item, a feature over which
some consumer groups have voiced concern, fearing secret price changes by merchants.
There will be some surprising developments in other areas too. General
retailers, especially the larger chains and affiliated department stores, will, within a
relatively short time, begin scanning their merchandise with "wands." Presently,
general merchandisers collect information about the goods they sell by reading per-
forated paper tickets collected, somewhat haphazardly, after sale. "Wanding" promises
to capture information on a greater percentage of sales and give the retailer a better
picture of his inventory turnover.
4. The development of automated clearing houses, their operating rules and
procedures, and some of the legal issues they present are discussed in Homrighausen,
One Large Step Toward Less-Check: The California Automated Clearing House
System, 28 Bus. LAW. 1143 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Homrighausen].
The principal banking-trade paper, American Banker, has faithfully chronicled
the development of electronic funds transfer services. The author is indebted to
Phillip Brooke, Technology Editor, for many helpful references to stories which have
appeared in the Banker and which form a factual background for this article. The
stories tracing these developments have been so numerous as to make it impractical
to list them.
5. Arthur D. Little, Inc., The Outlook for the Nation's Payments System:
1970-1980, at 7, Dec., 1970.
6. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement of Policy on
Payments Mechanism, 57 FED. Rs. BuL.. 546 (1971). See also Evolution of the
Payments Mechanism, 58 FED. REs. BuLL. 1009 (1972).
7. Atlanta Payments Project, Automated Clearing Houses: An In-Depth
Analysis, at 17, Mar., 1974. This study is the most recent of the several published
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The fruition of these various studies was the opening, in October
of 1972 and May of 1973, of automated clearing houses in San Fran-
cisco and Los Angeles, and in Atlanta. The principal function of
these automated clearing houses is the distribution of payroll pay-
ments, but the system is also designed to permit individuals to initiate
recurring payments, such as mortgage and utility payments. Em-
ployer payments, consisting of wages and salaries due employees, are
made by means of magnetic tape or punched cards delivered to either
the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank or the Los Angeles branch.
Magnetic tape, punched cards, or paper advices (for banks not having
the necessary processing equipment) containing the appropriate in-
formation are then forwarded to the employee's bank. The employer's
bank pays the employee's bank by interbank settlement at the Federal
Reserve Bank."
At this writing the volume of transactions has been rather low,
about 40,000 payments per month. Even so, the system significantly
reduces the flurry of paper required to effect these payments through
the use of checks. It is anticipated that as more employers join the
system, the volume of transactions will greatly increase. The Atlanta
system works in much the same way; again, primarily payroll items
are processed in the manner described above. Similar automated clear-
ing house operations were begun in Boston and Minneapolis in July
of 1974, and other cities are expected to follow suit.
An automated clearing house speaks volumes about electronic
funds transfer (EFT). It is also a logical starting point in the de-
velopment of EFT systems. The automated clearing house (ACH)
builds upon the old and familiar clearing house where checks and cash
letters are exchanged. At the same time the ACH illustrates an
important consequence of the substitution of a financial institution
payment mechanism for cash: to have a payments mechanism, there
must be provision for settling payment transactions between financial
institutions where the party paying and the party paid do not bank
at the same institution. Under the present system banks maintain
clearing balances on one another or on a common bank, such as the
Federal Reserve Bank. The new automated clearing house still adjusts
balances, as it must, but with much greater speed since transactions
to be cleared are processed electronically and not by means of hand
sorting, paper and pen, and someone skilled in figures.
by the Atlanta Payments Project. The report develops the "concept, design, and
implementation plan for an automated clearing house (ACH) system." Id. at 1.
8. See Homrighausen, supra note 4.
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Not long after the announcement of the implementation of auto-
mated clearing houses by commercial banks in a few cities, a federally
chartered savings and loan association, whose statutory powers differ
in several significant respects from the powers of federally chartered
banks,9 that is, national banks, devised a remote deposit and with-
drawal system. Again, the terminal, as in the case of the grocery
check-out, is in the supermarket,'" and, essentially, the federal asso-
ciation offered to take a supermarket out of the check cashing business.
A supermarket customer who is an association accountholder tenders
a supermarket employee a plastic card that is placed in a reading de-
vice that captures information contained in a magnetic stripe located
on the back of the card. This information, together with a personal
identification number, authenticates requests to deal with the account.
A supermarket employee enters the transaction type (whether deposit,
withdraw, or check cashing) and the amount into a communications
device linked by telephone lines to the central computer at the associa-
tion. The central processing unit then checks authenticating information
and effects a transfer of funds in the amount indicated. In the case of a
withdrawal, the customer's account at the association is debited, and
he receives cash from the supermarket's own cash on hand after the
central processing unit has indicated to the supermarket employee that
the withdrawal transaction may proceed. The supermarket makes
itself whole in the transaction by receiving a credit to an account
that it maintains at the association. In the case of a cash deposit, the
supermarket receives the cash after the central processing unit has
authorized a deposit transaction. The depositor's account is credited
and the supermarket's account at the institution is debited. Deposits
by check are treated in the same way as cash deposits, except that the
supermarket forwards the check for collection. Several other savings
and loan associations and commercial banks plan to offer similar plastic-
card activated services.
The commercial bank automated clearing house and the federal
association supermarket deposit, withdrawal, and check cashing serv-
ice are the two principal electronic funds transfer services under dis-
cussion by the financial industry at this writing." There is another
9. One of the most significant limitations on payment powers is contained in
Section 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b) (1) (1970),
concerning the use of "negotiable and transferable" payment orders.
10. Supermarkets do a great deal of financial business. It is rumored that in one
state a single supermarket chain cashes more checks per unit of time than does any
financial institution but one, and that institution happens to be the largest bank in
the country.
11. Fedwire, an electronic funds transfer system run by the Federal Reserve
System, transfers great sums between Federal Reserve banks, including some third
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mode of providing electronically facilitated financial services at the
point of customer contact which is probably more familiar to the reader.
These are the so-called automated cash dispensers and automated teller
machines. These machines, which are usually found on or in the wall
of a home office or branch of a financial institution, may receive de-
posits in the form of cash or check, may perform transfer functions
between accounts of the same individual, and may dispense cash.'2 A
few thousand are currently in use. These machines have not gener-
ated as much interest in industry circles as have the other two systems,
chiefly, it seems, because their use does not contain the competitive
threat of the other two systems. These units are not as versatile as
the ACH, and are more costly than the simple communications device
of the supermarket system.
The final class of funds transfer operations, a combination of the
ACH and supermarket systems, is the point-of-sale or point-of-pur-
chase system.' 3 Like the supermarket system outlined above, the
point-of-sale system involves a third party, but with the difference
that payment can be effected without the intervention of currency.
That is, the customer's purchase initiates a withdrawal from his ac-
count at a financial institution and an instantaneous credit to the
account of the retailer. Where the customer and business enterprise
do not maintain their accounts at the same financial institution, there
party transfers, such as in the purchase of commercial paper by corporations. In 1973
the Fedwire transferred over $23 trillion. ANuJAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVER-
NORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 1973, at 286 (Table 9) (1974). Settlement
between Federal Reserve Banks occurs through the Interdistrict Settlement Fund
maintained in Washington, D.C. The central switching mechanism for these transfers
is located in Culpepper, Virginia.
Bankwire is a private sector equivalent of Fedwire. Bankwire also trans-
mits funds, but only where the two parties to the transmission maintain balances on
one another as correspondent banks. There is little published information regarding
Bankwire operations. For a brief description of Bankwire, see Knight, The Chang-
ing Payments Mechanism: Electronic Funds Transfer Arrangements, MONTHLY
REVIEW, July-Aug., 1974, at 19 n.15 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, Missouri) [hereinafter cited as Knight].
12. See Zimmer, The Status of Automated Tellers and Cash Dispensers, BANK
ADMINISTRATION, Aug., 1974, at 26, for an authoritative discussion of the use of
these machines.
13. There are other payment services in addition to those described here which
do not involve the transfer of funds. One example is the "credit pad," which is a
communications device used to inquire as to the risk associated with accepting a check
tendered by a customer in payment See PAYMENT SYSTEMS NEWSLETTER, July, 1974,
at 2. Facilities initially used for account verifications may, at a later time, be employed
for performance of other financially related services, such as credit extensions. Knight,
supra note 11, at 12-15, descnbes other payment services, such as check truncation,
which have generated little interest See also Survey, Toward a Less-Check Society,
47 No=R DAME LAW. 1163 (1972).
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will be a need to settle accounts through something like the auto-
mated clearing house described above, with the buying customer
taking the place of the employer and the retailer taking the place of
the employee. This system may be viewed as the "pure" or "true"
electronic funds transfer system, being one in which payments are in-
stantaneous and independent of the use of paper. Such a system is
hypothetical at this writing, 4 although one federal savings and loan
association plans to install a grocery payment service that will operate
in this manner. A very different system, used to pay monthly bills
from home, has also surfaced. A few mutual savings banks are now
offering pay-by-phone services which permit accountholders to pay
any designated payee.
This, then, is the broad sweep of electronic funds transfer in the
second quarter of 1975. It seems likely that automated clearing houses
will be established in major metropolitan areas over the next several
years. Displacement of cash and checks at the point of sale or for use
in paying monthly bills will doubtless grow more slowly. A vast
number of consumers must find the system attractive if the "cashless-
checkless society" is to flourish, whereas, by contrast, an automated
clearing house takes its impetus from the concurrence of large employers
and their employees. Use of automated clearing houses for federal and
state social welfare payments should also spur ACH development.'-
Presently, the principal dynamic in the development of electronic
payment systems' 6 of the types described is the deposit competition
existing at the margin of the respective statutory and regulatory
14. Fedwire and Bankwire, described in note 11 supra, and ACH operations
may all involve third party transfers. It is the point-of-sale or point-of-purchase
EFT system, however, that, rightly or wrongly, is regarded as the "true" EFT
system. A recently published study suggests the possibility of business-to-business
EFT systems. See Credit Research Foundation, Inc., Electronic Funds Transfer
Systems for Business Payments (1973).
15. 31 U.S.C. § 492 (1970) permits government benefit payments to be directly
deposited in a financial institution for the credit of beneficiaries. The Department of
the Treasury and the Social Security Administration are presently studying imple-
mentation of a direct deposit procedure similar to the ACH employer payments
discussed above. See Department of the Treasury, Federal Recurring Payments
Through Financial Organizations by Means Other Than by Check, 40 Fed. Reg.
16669 (1975), which sets forth proposed regulations regarding this program.
16. The development of a payments system is fundamentally rooted in and
dependent upon development of appropriate hardware. Major nationwide retail
chains and nationally affiliated department stores are expected, within the next several
years, to have electronic cash registers in place which could serve as payment termi-
nals. This action by retailers may mean that they will have a significant voice in the
determination of available payment services. Retailing chains have also competed
vigorously for credit. According to one recent study a large retailing chain has a
credit program "more sizable than either of the two national bank charge card
systems." C. CHRISTOPHE) COMPETITION FOR FINANCIAL SERvIcEs 5 (1974).
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powers of commercial banking and thrift institutions. 17 As other
parties begin more fully to seek participation in a payment system,
the electronic funds transfer system equilibrium will become increas-
ingly complex and convoluted.
This article will examine, with financial institutions receiving
the most attention, what is in essence a movement by society into an
environment where financial services will be provided without paper.
No claim is made here that the treatment of problems discussed is
exhaustive. The conclusions offered are tentative, an appropriate
posture since so many facets of electronic payment systems are as yet
undeveloped. It is hoped that the remarks which follow will provoke
further discussion. Nevertheless, the legal problems presented by
electronic funds transfer systems are of some immediacy because these
systems will, in all probability, fundamenfally alter current patterns of
business practice. Electronic funds transfer systems will change the
way in which banking institutions deal with their customers, and they
will alter the existing competitive balance among these institutions.
Important and difficult regulatory questions are presented, and, because
EFT will generate a new base of information regarding the behavior
of our citizens, significant constitutional questions will be raised.
The areas of legal concern to be examined are the following: (1)
At the outset financial services will be offered by financial institutions
subject to state and federal regulation. The question presented is
whether these services are permissible given the statutory powers of
the relevant institutions. (Only federal limitations will be explored;
state limitations are myriad.) The branching limitations of national
banks will be considered in detail. (2) Electronic funds transfer sys-
tems require information interchange for settlement purposes. This
information must either be physically delivered, as in the case of the
ACH magnetic tapes, or communicated directly over telephone com-
pany lines. Since communication common carriers are regulated en-
tities, a question arises concerning the extent to which regulation by
the Federal Communications Commission and by the state communi-
cations regulatory authorities is proper. The issues raised in this
area by decisions of the FCC will be discussed but briefly. (3) The
question of the relevance of the complex body of law concerning negoti-
able instruments and "bank deposits and collections" of Articles 3
and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code has two major subdivisions:
the utility of the UCC payment rules in an electronic environment and
the extent to which the body of federal law that may be expected to
develop regarding these electronic funds transfer systems will super-
17. See Part I infra.
1975]
fu MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 35
cede any inconsistent UCC provisions. (4) Questions presented under
the broad heading of the "credit card" debate include the applicability
of the provisions of Title VI of the Federal Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act and the extent to which the development of these services
trouble the familiar distinction between "payment" and "credit." (5)
New safety and security problems are posed by the new systems. Diffi-
culties in applying current criminal prohibitions regarding theft, em-
bezzlement,' and the like, applicable to federal financial institutions,
will be examined. (6) Antitrust considerations unique to electronic
funds transfer systems will be analyzed. Of particular interest are
questions c6ncerning the clearing systems and other points of access
to electronic' funds transfer systems, and the doctrine of "essential
facilities," or "bottlenecks." (7) Finally to be explored are the broad
political questions which such systems raise. The integrity of a pay-
ments system' is critically dependent upon the correct identification of
users (in contrast to the cash systems)." A principal cause for con-
cern will be the increased potential for political control which seems
to be inherent in the system. Related to these concerns is the matter
of "privacy" in one's financial affairs.
I. FEDERAL CONTROL OVER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER
SERVICES THROUGH "BRANCHING" AND
"PAYMENT POWERS" LIMITATIONS
The body of law establishing federal control over financial insti-
,tutions qua financial institutions is complex. It involves a division of
responsibility among federal regulatory agencies based on chartering
authority, whether state or federal, membership in the Federal Reserve
System or Federal Home Loan Bank System, and federal insurance
of deposits and accounts.1 9 The focus here will be on federal regula-
tion of the establishment of "branches" and over what may broadly
be termed "payment powers." The discussion will be limited to insti-
tutions which are regulated by the principal banking agencies - the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
A. Federal Control Over Branching
The federal statutory restrictions on branching of thrift institu-
tions that are federally chartered, federally insured, or members of the
18. See generally HENDRICKSON, THE CASHLESS SOCIETY (1972).
19. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565, 571 (1966),
presents a somewhat dated review of the authorities.
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Federal Home Loan Bank System are relatively simpler than those
of commercial banks. There are (almost) °2 0 none. However, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which administers the legislation
establishing federal regulatory control over savings and loan associa-
tions, as a matter of policy limits the branching of federal savings and,
loan associations by taking into account branch or branch-like limita-
tions applied to state chartered associations.2'
National banks, before establishing new "branches," must gain
the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency,22 state chartered
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System must obtain
approval of its Board of Governors, 23 and non-member state-chartered
banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation must
obtain approval of the Corporation.24  Federal approval power is
significantly limited by the actions of state authorities, since federal
legislation renders the branching power of national banks (and of
state member banks) dependent upon state law25 and subjects state
non-member insured banks to similar requirements in establishing
branches.26 This reliance on state law poses problems for the estab-
lishment of electronic funds transfer systems because of a tendency
to treat the hardware necessary for the functioning of these systems
as "branches," and because a large number of states have enacted legis-
lation which imposes varying degrees of restraint on branching.27
20. Section 5(c) of the Home Owner's Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1970),
establishes statutory approval procedures for District of Columbia building and
loan associations.
21. 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b) (1975).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
23. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(d) (1970).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city,
town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and
operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the
State in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said associa-
tion is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to
State banks by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically
granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition,
and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on
State banks.
See also 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
26. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(d) (1970).
27. See Kreps, Modernizing Banking Regulation, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
648, 657 (1966) ; Verkuil, Perspectives on Reform 'of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE
L.J. 1349 (1974); 1 CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. ff 3106 (1973).
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Section 36(c) of the National Bank Act, 8 which contains the
statutory authority for branching by national banks, 29 has served as
a kind of fulcrum for the debate over proper state-federal control of
banking. Section 36(c) provides generally that national banks may
branch to the extent authorized for state banks by state law.30 The pre-
cise linkage between state and federal branching authority has been
subject to searching inquiry by the courts. In First National Bank v.
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 1 the principal case construing section
36(c), it was contended that so long as there is some state statutory
authorization for the establishment of branches, the Comptroller may
approve national bank branches without regard to state imposed limi-
tations. The contention advanced was consistent with the language of
section 36(c) (1) which required that the service in question be "at
the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State
in question." Had that argument prevailed, a state statute permitting
branching to any extent would have opened the door to branching by
national banks subject only to the Comptroller's approval. The Court
rejected the tendered reading, however, saying:
It appears.., that Congress intended to place national and
state banks on a basis of "competitive equality" insofar as branch
banking was concerned ....
The Comptroller argues that [the state's] statute "expressly
authorizes" state banks to have branches in their home munici-
palities. He maintains that the restriction, in the subsequent para-
graph of the [state] statute limiting branching solely to the taking
over of an existing bank, is not applicable to national banks. It is
a strange argument that permits one to pick and choose what
portion of the law binds him. Indeed, it would fly in the face of
the legislative history not to hold that national branch banking is
limited to those States the laws of which permit it, and even there
"only to the extent that the State laws permit branch banking."3
National banks, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, have on occasion attempted to avoid restrictive state branching
28. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
29. See note 25 supra.
30. See note 25 supra.
31. 385 U.S. 252 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967). Prior state
disapproval of branching applications evidently eliminates a similar determination by
the Federal Reserve under 12 U.S.C § 321 (1970) for state member banks, although
the same combined federal-state standard used in section 36(c) of the National Bank
Act is made applicable. While the same or a similar question of appropriate standards
could theoretically arise with respect to state non-member insured banks under 12
U.S.C. §§ 1828(d), 1816 (1970), the question has evidently not been one subject to
analysis in reported decisions.
32. 385 U.S. at 261.
[VOL. 35
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statutes by contending that a facility was not a branch and, there-
fore, not subject to the branching limitations imposed by section 36(c).
Section 36(f), which defines the word "branch," provides:
The term 'branch' as used in this section shall be held to include
any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office,
or any branch place of business ... at which deposits are received,
or checks paid, or money lent.88
In First National Bank v. Dickinson 4 a national bank located in
Florida received permission from the Comptroller to operate an arm-
ored car messenger service and an off-premises receptacle to receive
cash and checks for deposit.8 5 The Florida Comptroller contended
that these services violated Florida's prohibition against branch bank-
ing, and hence section 36(c). First National and the Comptroller
countered that the activity engaged in by First National did not amount
to the operation of a branch as defined in section 36(f).
The Court rejected the Comptroller's contention "that state law
definitions of what constitutes 'branch banking' must control the con-
tent of the federal definition of § 36(f)," 6 reasoning that Congress
could not have intended that the states have the power to authoritatively
interpret section 36(f) and thus be "the sole judges of their own
powers."3 7 Dickinson thus suggests that Walker Trust, which bound
national bank branching limitations to state branching limitations,
does not put the power of determination exclusively in the hands
of the states.
Having pronounced the definition of "branch" to be a matter of
federal law, the Court next turned to the question whether the activi-
ties of First National amounted to branch banking under section 36(f).
The bank had argued that it was not "receiving deposits" apart from
its chartered place of business, since by agreement with its customers
deposits were not deemed made until funds were actually delivered to
the bank's tellers at its chartered premises. The Court ruled, however,
that while the contracting parties were free to arrange their own liabili-
ties, it did not follow that such arrangements determine the meaning of
section 36(f). The Court gave this gloss to the definition of "branch":
Because the purpose of the statute is to maintain competitive
equality, it is relevant in construing 'branch' to consider, not
33. 12U.S.C.§36(f) (1970).
34. 396 U.S. 122, rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 1047 (1969).
35. The armored car would call at places of business to pick up cash or checks
for deposit or to deliver cash to meet business needs; the stationary receptacle was
located in a shopping center and could be used to make deposits.
36. 396 U.S. at 133 (footnote omitted).
37. Id.
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merely the contractual rights and liabilities created by the trans-
action, but all those aspects of the transaction that might give the
bank an advantage in its competition for customers. Unquestion-
ably, a competitive advantage accrues to a bank that provides the
service of receiving money for deposit at a place away from its
main office; the convenience to the customer is unrelated to
whether the relationship of debtor and creditor is established at
the moment of receipt or somewhat later.38
The Court held that for purposes of the "receipt of deposits" require-
ments of section 36(f), deposits had been received at the time the
customer delivered his deposit either to the armored carrier or to the
stationary receptacle. The service offered, therefore, was within the
definition of a "branch" and, since branching was prohibited under
Florida law, was thus prohibited under section 36(c).
The law of national bank branching after Walker Trust and
Dickinson is not easily stated. The holding in Dickinson foreclosed a
narrow reading of the term "branch" under section 36(f). The Court
emphasized the broad sweep of the definition39 and bottomed its hold-
ing upon considerations of "competitive advantage." Taken together,
Walker Trust and Dickinson preserve a limited measure of flexibility
to the Comptroller in construing section 36, however. Under section
36 (c) the Comptroller must look to state law, including its limitations,
to find the words which will permit proposed national bank facilities to
go forward. At the same time he may frame his definition of "branch"
under section 36(f), not upon the requirements of state law (as under
section 36(c)), but rather upon considerations of "competitive advan-
tage." The Comptroller may thus shield and insulate approvals where
he cart show no "advantage in . . . competition for customers," and
thus that no branch has been established. °
The Comptroller is not entirely precluded from giving a com-
petitive advantage to national banks. Where state banks, although
authorized by state law to engage in certain activities, in practice are
38. Id. at 136-37.
39. See id. at 135.
40. Walker Trust and Dickinson are cases which blunt competitive initiatives
by national banks; they may have gone too far in that direction. State authorities
may be free to secure a competitive advantage for state banks by excluding EFT
terminals from the state definition of a "branch." National banks could thus be pre-
sented with a dilemma: a service which constitutes a "branch" under section 36(f)
because of its potential competitive advantage and which, therefore, may be prohibited
to national banks under section 36(c) and state branching laws, but a service which,
on the other hand, is permitted to state banks. Perhaps it will be necessary in such
cases to consider state law definitions in defining branch banking under section 36(f),
at least insofar as state definitions might eliminate any potential competitive advan-
tage for national banks.
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not making use of their authority, the Comptroller will find a "com-
petitive advantage" and thus a section 36(f) branch, but he will also
find, and thus may approve, the activity permitted by state law under
section 36 (c).
A critical issue remaining after Walker Trust and Dickinson is
the proper measure of "competitive advantage." Shortly before the
Dickinson case, the Court determined that in measuring the com-
petitive effects of bank mergers for purposes of section 7 of the Clayton
Act,4 the "cluster of services" offered by the merging institutions,
rather than the individual service offerings such as checking and sav-
ings accounts, was the appropriate product market. 2 In Dickinson
the "competitive advantage" of the remote deposit and checking serv-
ices seems to have been assumed by the Court even though one could
have argued that a broader measure of advantage could have been taken.
B. Federal Control Over Payment Powers
Control over what may be termed the "payment powers" of finan-
cial institutions exists at both the federal and state level. The checking
account, of course, is the premier payment account; it involves the use
of negotiable payment orders drawn on commercial banks accessing
on account payable on demand. Familiar state law rules govern the
negotiability of the payment order4" and the nature of an account
payable on demand,44 as well as other matters concerned with the
business of written payment orders.
Federal control over payment accounts builds upon the under-
lying state law structures and consists of three central limitations.
First, while commercial banks are authorized to offer checking ac-
counts, member and insured banks are prohibited from paying interest
on accounts payable on demand. 5 Secondly, the authority of federally
chartered savings and loan associations (but not of other classes of
insured and member thrift institutions) to offer payment services is
limited by statutory provisions governing the transferability and nego-
tiability of orders drawn on their accounts.4 6 Recently enacted legis-
41. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
42. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
43. The references here, of course, are to Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (1972).
44. UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 3-108 provides: "Instruments payable on
demand include those payable at sight or on presentation and those in which no time
for payment is stated." Under state law, instruments, rather than accounts, therefore,
are payable on demand.
45. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371a, 461, 1828(g) (1970).
46. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b) (1) (1970).
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lation4 7 prohibits the payment of interest on accounts using negotiable
or transferable instruments for all states except New Hampshire and
Massachusetts and applies to both commercial banks and to thrift in-
stitutions.4 After much debate over the legislation, an interest bearing
account, whether or not payable on demand, may be used in connection
with negotiable orders of withdrawal (the so-called NOW account)
in those two states."' The federal financial agencies concerned have
issued implementing regulations."° Thirdly, checking account deposits
of member commercial banks, which include about 5,700 of the nation's
14,000 commercial banks, representing roughly four-fifths of bank
demand deposit liabilities,"' are subject to the reserve requirements
imposed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2
Federal control over the use of accounts maintained at financial in-
stitutions as payment accounts is thus dependent upon two factors:
whether a negotiable instrument is to be used in connection with the
account, and whether the account is payable on demand.53 All three
central federal limitations on the use of such accounts as payment
accounts may be derived from these two factors.
Savings and loan associations, just as commercial banks for time
deposits, have historically maintained savings accounts as non-demand
accounts, that is, accounts on which the association may claim a right
to notice prior to honoring withdrawal requests. In practice savings
accounts and time deposits have been payable "on demand" in the
sense that withdrawal requests are routinely honored at the teller's
window. The physical inconvenience of visiting a banking or savings
and loan office has limited use of time and savings deposits as a
''payment account," although clearly cash obtained from withdrawal
47. Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-100, § 2, 87 Stat. 342 (codified at 12
U.S.C.A. § 1832 (Supp. 1975)).
48. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1832(a), (b) (Supp. 1975).
49. The initiatives of a Massachusetts mutual savings bank which gave rise to
this legislation, together with a discussion of some of the legal issues presented, is
found in Comment, The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) Account: "Check-
ing Accounts" for Savings Banks?, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 471 (1973).
50. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.5 (1975).
51. FDIC, ASSETS AND LIABmTs - COMMERCIAL AND MUTUAL SAVINGS
BANKS, June 30, 1974, at 4-5 (1974). The Federal Reserve has since 1964 sought
legislation to increase required membership in the Federal System. See C. Gambs,
Monetary Innovation and Monetary Control, at 29 (Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Working Paper No. 50, Feb. 18, 1975). See generally M.J. FLANNERY & D.M. JAFFEE,
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF AN ELECTRONIC MONETARY TRANSFER SYSTEM (1973).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1970).
53. But see note 44 supra. State law, then, apparently determines when instru-
nients are payable on demand, federal law when deposits are payable on demand. See
12 U.S.C. §§ 371a, 461, 1828(g) (1970).
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from the accounts is used for payments. In New Hampshire and
Massachusetts a negotiable order of withdrawal drawn on an interest
bearing account may be subject to a prior notification requirement and
still function as a check since there is no need to visit the office location.5
Although non-Federal Reserve member institutions, such as savings
and loan associations, presently offer NOW accounts, the legislation
establishing them does not require that special reserves be maintained.
C. Branching, Payment Powers, and Electronic
Funds Transfer Systems
The branching and payment powers limitations address two very
different sets of problems. The branching debate is a debate over
which governmental authority, state or federal, shall have control of
banking institutions. Limitations on the power to make payments, on
the other hand, raise questions of competition among classes of insti-
tutions; the debate over which services should be permitted for which
classes of institutions may occur at either the state or the federal level.
These problems are related, of course. The branching question has an
obvious competitive component, and the financial services questions
have broad government policy facets, including the question of how
best to secure adequate financing for home ownership." Electronic
funds transfer systems raise both sets of problems, control and com-
petitive balance, at once. As a result, the existing legal categories for
defining these two sets of problems, the "branch" and the "check," do
not well serve to focus the debate over these new systems.
Branching is a conceptual hobgoblin. The Supreme Court in
Dickinson took the definition of the branch to the extreme of gener-
ality by, in effect, declaring any activity creating a "competitive advan-
tage" to be a section 36(f) branch. Its plain meaning conjures up
something different - an impressive building festooned with marble
and brass. It is not a very great leap to extend the branch idea to a
machine established by a financial institution for the purpose of carry-
ing on a set of banking transactions. The conceptual picture clouds
considerably, however, where someone other than a bank owns and
operates the machine, for example, a cash register located in a retail
location and wired to a bank's computer for purposes of making pay-
ments by adjusting balances between customer and store. Several
opinions of attorneys general and recent state EFTS legislation have
54. An order of withdrawal may be negotiable and still not payable on demand,
of course.
55. See, e.g., FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
FOR THE FUTURE (1975).
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addressed the device-as-branch question, arriving at various conclu-
sions. 6 No clear trend has yet emerged. As will be seen presently,
both major federal financial regulatory agencies having chartering
authority have determined that electronic funds transfer terminals
are not branches. 5
7
Proper classification of these systems as branches or not is a
controversy which will, in all probability, not soon abate. By focusing
on the devices as branches, a forum is provided for the continuing
debate over federal versus state control of these new services and of
banking in general. To characterize the devices as the equivalent of
passbooks or checks is a point which state regulatory authorities may
be unwilling to concede, although functional equivalencies may be seen,
since there is no serious question of the power of the federal govern-
ment to determine what services federally chartered institutions may
offer. At the same time, there is no absence of cases involving liabili-
ties on a check which are determined in accordance with state law,
even though the check is drawn on a federally chartered bank.5 Indi-
vidual institutions chartered by different authorities will have an
interest in branch characterizations, especially where branch determi-
nations fix rights of protest to such installations.59
As the Dickinson Court noted, the branching issue is one con-
cerned with competitive advantage as between state and federally
chartered institutions, and certainly the institutions which establish
these devices hope to gain just such an advantage. One can question,
of course, whether installation of these devices has as significant a
competitive impact as installation of a full-fledged branch, bricks and
all. There is an interesting consequence to the branch-as-competitive-
56. In Illinois, for example, the Attorney General has ruled that the installation
on bank premises of currency dispensing machines in national and also in state
chartered banks constitutes a prohibited branch bank. Op. ILL. ATT'y GEN., File No.
S-734 (1974). The Kansas Attorney General has ruled, however, that a supermarket
deposit and withdrawal system making use of computer terminals installed by financial
institutions but operated by store personnel is permissible under state law, even though
Kansas prohibits "branching" except fr certain "auxiliary teller services." OP.
KANSAS ATr'y GEN., No. 74-196 (1974); KAN. STAr. ANN. § 9-1111 (Supp. 1974).
The Kansas Attorney General reasoned that the business of banking was not trans-
acted at the terminal locations but on bank premises. Kansas has recently enacted
statutes dealing with electronic funds transfers, declaring the terminals not to be
"branches." Senate Bill Nos. 513, 519 (1975). Utah, while not declaring electronic
funds transfer systems to be "branches," has nevertheless placed a moratorium on
their emplacement until July 1, 1976. Senate Bill No. 100 (1975). Many states are
now in the process of adopting electronic funds transfer legislation.
57. See text accompanying notes 60-61 and 64 infra.
58. E.g., Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962).
59. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-5.14 (1975).
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advantage idea. If over the long term, at least at retail locations, the
devices are shared by all financial institutions, as seems to be the in-
evitable trend, what may colorably constitute a competitive advantage
initially for national banks will miraculously disappear; competitive
advantage and branch will rise and fall together.
Electronic technology confuses payment powers limitations as well
by doing away with the necessity of creating a negotiable instrument
for purposes of conveying payment orders from accountholder to finan-
cial institution. As a result the new technologies present two intriguing
options to users. The accountholder can turn any account into a "pay-
ment account" by dealing in cash if machines are strategically and
conveniently located, or the accountholder could, by electronically order-
ing the institution to do the paying for him by appropriate debits and
credits to accounts, eliminate the use of cash or paper. Either procedure
may exist within present federal limitations on payment accounts.
As among classes of institutions offering different services, neither
present federal limitations on use of accounts for payment nor the
competitive impact of electronic funds transfer systems command re-
striction of their use to institutions having checking account powers.
From the competitive point of view, at least in the near term, although
the electronic funds transfer terminal may be used to effect cash or
electronic payments, the retail terminal is clearly not as versatile as
its paper check cousin. A terminal is required at each location where
a payment is to be made. At best, electronic funds transfer terminals
are only rudimentary, location-bound payment media.
To try to shoe-horn these new systems and devices into uncom-
fortable categories in an attempt to resolve the government authority
and competitive balance issues they raise is an unhelpful if not unwise
course. Electronic funds transfer systems will require a new set of
limitations to serve financial institution policy. The labeling of these
systems should come after, not before, the policy debate.
D. Federal Regulatory Actions
At this writing two regulatory agencies have issued electronic
funds transfer regulations and one has issued an electronic funds trans-
fer ruling. The "remote service unit" regulation of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, issued on June 28, 1974,0° permits federally char-
tered savings and loan associations to "establish, maintain or use one
or more remote service units" located, generally, within the state
where the association's home office is located. A remote service unit
60. 39 Fed. Reg. 23991 (1974) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1975)).
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is not a branch or other office facility of a federal association, but is
defined as "an information processing device . ..by means of which
information relating to financial services rendered to the public is
stored and transmitted ... to a financial institution and which ... is
dependent upon the use of a machine-readable instrument in the posses-
sion and control" of accountholders. 1 The definition includes com-
puter terminals in retail locations and automated teller machines. It
most probably would not include a home terminal or an automated
clearing house used to route employer or government payments.
The FHLBB regulation permits associations to "participate" in
the use of a remote service unit with other federally insured financial
institutions, including commercial banks, and contains a laundry list of
permitted activities, principally deposits and withdrawals. The FHLBB
regulation also provides that the Board will in some cases request the
views of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or require
clearance by the Department by means of a business review letter.
It requires that associations establishing remote service units "shall
establish and maintain safeguards acceptable to the Board to insure
the privacy and confidentiality of account information."
The FHLBB has received applications from federal associations
in over fifteen states pursuant to the regulation seeking permission to
establish automated teller machines, manned remote deposit and with-
drawal facilities in retail locations, and one proposal to use terminals
at a grocery store checkout counter which will permit electronic pay-
ments for groceries.62 Pilot projects approved under the regulation
will be terminated on July 31, 1975, unless the Board extends the
term of the regulation. The National Credit Union Administration
has also promulgated a regulation taking a similar pilot project ap-
proach to the establishment of electronic funds transfer systems by
credit unions.63
On December 12, 1974, the Comptroller of the Currency pub-
lished an Interpretative Ruling declaring that "customer-bank com-
munication terminals" are not branches within the meaning of section
36(f) of the National Bank Act. 4 The customer-bank communica-
tions terminal is not expressly defined, but the ruling provides that
national banks "may receive and act upon communications from its
61. 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2(j) (1) (1975).
62. Statement of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Hearings on S. 245 Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
63. 12 C.F.R. § 721.3 (1975).
64. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416 (1974). The ruling has been amended, as described in
the text. See 40 Fed. Reg. 21700 (1975).
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customers transmitted through electronic devices or machines request-
ing the withdrawal of funds either from the customer's deposit ac-
count or from a previously authorized line of credit, or instructing the
bank to receive funds or to transfer funds for the customer's benefit."'65
National banks wishing to establish the communications terminals are
to notify the Comptroller prior to installation and provide a detailed
description of the unit except where the devices are used only to trans-
fer funds or to verify a customer's credit for the purpose of cashing a
check or making a credit card transaction. Sharing of terminals with
other financial institutions is permitted, but not required, "to the
extent consistent with the antitrust laws." The communications termi-
nals may be established within fifty miles of a national bank's main
office or branch, and may be established without geographic limitation
if the unit is shared with one or more financial institutions located
within the trade area of the terminal. The ruling contains no termina-
tion date. The Comptroller has received over thirty notifications un-
der the ruling for automated teller machines and retail deposit and
withdrawal facilities.
In November of 1973, the Federal Reserve proposed an amend-
ment to its Regulation J (governing the collection of checks through
the Federal Reserve System).66 In brief, the proposal would permit
parties, through use of the Fedwire system, to initiate credit or debit
transactions. 67  Balances maintained by member banks at Federal
Reserve banks and the Interdistrict Settlement Fund (to effect the
transfer between Federal Reserve banks) would be used to accom-
plish the transfer of funds. The system proposed would be used prin-
cipally as a means of transferring credit among Federal Reserve
districts. National corporations, for example, could use the proposed
system to make employee payments or to accept payments, such as
for insurance premiums. The Federal Reserve sought comment on
three major questions: (1) the appropriate role in the ownership and
operation of various components of the proposed system by the Federal
Reserve System, other public bodies, and private institutions; (2) the
extent and conditions of access to the Fedwire system by various
65. 40 Fed. Reg. 21700 (1975).
66. 38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973).
67. Credit transfers are funds transfer orders given by an accountholder to his
financial institution with directions to pay a third party; debit transfers are the same
transfers of funds except that the party to be paid, rather than the accountholder,
initiates the transfer, in fashion similar to the way in which funds are transferred
through the present paper-based check collection system. Of course, parties need
not be accountholders to effect either type of transfer if they can provide the financial
institution with a substitute payment medium.
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financial institutions; and (3) the allocation of costs of operating the
system. Numerous parties submitted comments on the proposal, 68
which, at this writing, has not been adopted in final form.
The actions by the FHLBB and the Comptroller are currently the
subject of litigation testing the authority of the agencies to take these
actions.69 This litigation will provide the courts with an opportunity
to resolve some of the questions regarding federal limitations over
branching and payment powers discussed in earlier sections of this
Article. A National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers has been
recently established by the Congress for the purpose of examining the
implications of electronic funds transfer systems, including their rele-
vance to existing federal limitations over the operations of banking
institutions.7 ° If the federal regulatory actions are upheld, the National
Commission will have the benefit of an empirical base (at least of
systems established by federal institutions) upon which to make its
recommendations to Congress.
II. A SHORT LOOK AT COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES
If methods permitting payments to be accomplished instantane-
ously are used, as opposed to the non-instantaneous "batching" modes
used in ACHs and by most automated teller machines, some of the
issues concerning the regulation of communications media will be con-
fronted. American Telephone and Telegraph and its associated com-
panies provide most of the nation's communications services as a
regulated monopoly. Where electronic funds transfer services are
to be provided instantaneously, the lines of these companies will be
used, either through the switched network which regularly permits
dialed telephone calls, or through lines directly linking communications
points, the so-called dedicated lines." One cannot willy-nilly connect
one's own equipment to lines of a communications common carrier. In
fact, until recently, telephone company rules forbade any type of
"interconnection" outright. The FCC, in its celebrated Carterfone
68. See the published comment of Brandel & Gresham, Electronic Payments:
Government Intervention or New Frontier for Private Initiative, 29 Bus. LAW.
1133 (1974).
69. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp.
979 (D. Colo. 1975) (application of Comptroller's ruling held to be branch banking) ;
State ex rel. Meyer v. American Community Stores Corp., 193 Neb. 634, 228 N.W.2d
299 (1975) (authority of FHLBB upheld).
70. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 201-08 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1733-37).
71. The Fedwire uses such dedicated lines to perform credit transfer functions
between Federal Reserve banks.
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decision,72 determined that this rule unreasonably and discriminatorily
limited use of the telephone system. The telephone company has filed
a tariff with the FCC73 establishing certain technical specifications,
requiring the use of a telephone company provided interconnection
device, and prohibiting the introduction of "network control signalling,"
dialing, by customers. A formal rule-making proceeding currently un-
der way at the FCC is determining the reasonableness of the proposed
tariff.74 Argument on the merits of these tariff provisions will center
around increased maintenance costs, degradation of switching capa-
bility, and overload of the present system's communications capacity.
The dramatic increase in remote computer use led to serious dis-
ruptions of telephone service in some areas of the country during the
1960's. This suggests that a similar problem could be presented by
large scale use of electronic funds transfer systems operating in an
on-line, real-time mode. From an economic point of view, the tele-
phone company's current tariff structure, in which business service
subsidizes residential service, may be affected if a loss, or potential
loss, of revenues from business sources can be shown. The intercon-
nection question is made no easier by the existence of a jurisdictional
dispute between the FCC and state communications regulatory au-
thorities.7 5 And, of course, a substantial question raised by Carterfone
and the subsequent tariff is what the appropriate extent of AT&T in-
volvement in the provision of electronic funds transfer hardware and
payment services should be.
Beside attempts by regulated communications carriers to seal off
the communications system, there is the question of whether or not
EFT systems will be subject to communications regulation. The FCC
has taken the position that even where it has regulatory jurisdiction
over a communications service, it may decline to exercise that jurisdic-
tion where to do so would be in the public interest.7 6 In the Computer
Inquiry 7 the Commission determined not to regulate data processing
services even though those services may also involve communication
72. Use of Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d
420, petition for reconsideration denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
73. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 15 F.C.C.2d 605 (1968).
74. See Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message
Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), 35
F.C.C.2d 539 (1972).
75. Telerent Leasing Corp., 29 P&F RADIo REG. 2d 553 (1974), presents the
views of the FCC on federal regulation of interconnection.
76. See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 277-78 (Final
Decision and Order, 1971).
77. Id.
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services, such as between a terminal and a central processing unit.
The FCC might take a similar position where it could conclude that
the public interest was adequately being served by other regulatory
authorities. However, issues relating to the technology of communica-
tions are foreign to banking agencies and there well may be a case for
concurrent jurisdiction if communications issues can be split off from
banking issues. A determination that electronic funds transfer services
are common carrier services and subject to rate regulation would also,
under a 1956 consent decree,"8 provide a basis for AT&T participation
in the provision of these services which would not be limited to com-
munications hardware and service.
Certainly this bare outline cannot but suggest the importance of
these communications questions. We are not likely to soon see the
"pure" electronic funds transfer system that would raise these ques-
tions to the level of practical importance, though both Fedwire and
Bankwire, which regularly transfer billions of dollars in funds over
their facilities, are singular exceptions. What is most striking is the
seemingly artificial line, the use of telephone wires or radio communi-
cation, which brings with it a host of difficult communications regula-
tion issues. It may well be, as these systems and the debate on the sub-
ject mature, that some of the early distinctions will require redefinition.
III. ARTICLES 3 AND 4 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
An electronic funds transfer system may operate without any
paper whatsoever; the paper negotiable instrument may completely
disappear in the "pure" or "true" EFT system. The paper check pay-
ment mechanism with which we are so familiar can be replaced by an
electronic communications system. At least this is the prospect. If
this proves true, then the discussion of electronically facilitated financial
services which has begun to emerge in relation to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has been miscast. The central legal problem has been
viewed as one of fitting the contemplated systems into the provisions
of Article 4, "Bank Deposits and Collections," and especially into its
definition of "item." 7 The argument for application of Article 4 is
78. United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil No. 17-49 (D. N.J., judgment by
consent entered Jan. 24, 1956).
79. Clarke has made a forceful statement of this view in his An Item Is an Item
Is an Item: Article 4 of the U.C.C. and the Electronic Age, 25 Bus. LAW'. 109 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Clarke]. Professor Dunne took an early look at Fedwire and
the adequacy with which payment problems created by Fedwire were treated by the
Code. He concluded with suggested amendments to Article 4. Dunne, Variations on
a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the Uniform Commercial Code and
the Checkless Society, 75 YALE L.J. 788 (1966).
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easily traced. Section 4-104(1) (g) defines an "item" as "any in-
strument for the payment of money even though it is not negotiable
but does not include money."' An "instrument," while not defined
as such in Articles 4, 3, or 1, is taken to mean a "writing." A "writing,"
in turn, is defined in section 1-201 (46) to include "any . . . intentional
reduction to tangible form.""1 This section is taken as the basis for
the assertion that any durable medium used for the transmission of in-
formation, such as magnetic tape, even though not human-readable,
supplies the requisite "writing."8 2 Just as proponents of this argument
would concede that their deduction is lacking in certain critical defini-
tional steps, so one may as freely concede that the definition of "writ-
ing" is indeed quite broad. A writing, according to the proponents
of this argument, covers "the cave paintings of Altamira; the totemic
symbols of the Mixtecs; the calendario of the Aztecs; the syllabary of
the early Cypriots; [and] the Hindu sunya." 8 But the problem is to
devise appropriate rules for electronic funds transfer systems, not a
code of curatorial dispositions.
It would be better to free electronic funds transfer systems from
the assumption that the Code applies to disputes arising from use of
the new systems. There are two strong reasons for adopting this
approach. First, it is quite doubtful that the Code's draftsmen could
have foreseen the electronic funds transfer systems that are today
developing. The rules of Article 3 and Article 4 are old. The Code,
after all, achieved its general shape a generation ago,84 and successive
revisions of the Code have left Articles 3 and 4 virtually untouched.
Moreover, Article 3 traces its lineage to the nineteenth century British
Bills of Exchange Act, 5 and Article 4 to the Bank Collection Code,S6
approved by the sponsoring organization in 1928.87 Methods of pay-
80. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(1) (g).
81. UNIFORM COMMERCIA. CODE § 1-201(46).
82. See Clarke, supra note 79, at 112.
83. Id.
84. See Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 COLUM. L. REv. 798 (1958). Former Professor Braucher's article has become the
standard reference to Code drafting history.
85. See Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments
Law and Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 153 (1953).
86. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-101, COmment.
87. See II PATON'S DIGEST 1373 (1942). According to the sponsoring organi-
zation:
There has long been need for a uniform code of rules governing bank collec-
tions which will give the sanction of law to modern customs and practices of banks
and obviate the necessity for the printing of special agreements on deposit slips,
pass books and other literature for their protection. Not only are existing rules
growing out of earlier conditions which no longer obtain, unsuited to present
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ment are changing and may require entirely different legal treatntent.
Do we not commit an indiscretion of judgment by proceeding on the
assumption that rules for the regulation of electronic funds transfer
systems must be extracted from the comfortable regime of Articles 3
and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a system of rules derived
from a paper information transfer system?
Secondly, attempted extractions have placed untenably strained
constructions on the Code's provisions. To conclude that signalling
or communications systems, in which information is stored on mag-
netic tape or on disks at the central processing unit, are synonymous
with the inked, human-readable paper memoranda that traditionally
constituted Code items strains credulity. To reach such a conclusion
troubles the fundamental soundness of a code which sought "to avoid
making practical issues between practical men turn upon the location
of an intangible something . . .and to substitute for such abstractions
proof of words and actions of a tangible character.""8 The significant
reforms of Article 9, for example, were likewise dependent upon
analysis of function rather than upon conceptual matters.8 9 The rules
respecting "commercial paper" and "bank deposits and collections"
take their soundness from and rest upon a foundation of practical
affairs. To the extent that matters are to change by the introduction
of new electronic funds transfer systems, the case for the application
of Code provisions is undercut, as may be seen by an examination of
several sections of Articles 3 and 4 that are inapposite in their literal
application to EFT systems.
conditions, but the conflict of such rules, as established in the different states,
makes uniformity -a desideratum especially as the currency of checks and other
paper is nation-wide in scope and the rules governing the collection and payment
of such paper should be uniform, irrespective of state lines.
To accomplish the purpose of uniformity and modernization of the law govern-
ing bank collections, three sudcessive tentative drafts of a bank collection code
were prepared and submitted to various bankers, expert in the practice of check
collection, to attorneys for banks and to members of the Committee on State
Legislation and the State Legislative Council of the American Bankers Associa-
tion for their suggestions and criticism.
The third tentative draft was approved in substance at the meeting on Octo-
ber 1, 1928, of the Committee on State Legislation subject to technical changes
which the General Counsel was authorized to make. ...
The detailed provisions of the code have proved to be practicable and it is
hoped that it can be uniformly enacted in all states. Due to the complications of
the subject it is a difficult one to regulate with scientific exactness. . ..
Id. (quoting from an opinion of the American Bankers Association).
88. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-101, Comment.
89. See G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 9.1, 43.1
(1965).
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Articles 3 and 4 deal with the fact that people desiring to make
payments (or to make promises to pay) are looking at,9" writing
upon,9 losing, 92 stealing,93 signing,94 forging,95 carrying about,96 re-
vising,97 failing to complete,9" doing business in strange places with,99
and otherwise handling paper. Many provisions of Articles 3 and 4
start with the assumption that the paper document will be read and
understood without the intervention of machines, that is, that the docu-
ments are human-readable. A transferee, for example, is to be able to
spot a negotiable instrument at a glance.' 0 By thus assuring himself
of the integrity of the instrument with which he deals, the transferee
may receive the protections of the holder in due course,'0 ' a doctrine
designed to promote the currency of the instrument and thus its utility
-in trade as a method of payment. If payments are to occur by means
of electronic communications networks, which will include standards
for the format of message transmissions, it is not clear that human-
readable components will play a significant role as an indicator of the
integrity of a transaction or in giving greater commercial utility to
90. A "writing" is a prerequisite for negotiability. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 3-104(1).
91. Part I of Article 3 permits a number of variations to be made in executing
instruments while not affecting the "negotiability" of the instruments. See, e.g.,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-105(1), 3-108, 3-109(1), 3-111(c), 3-112. Thus,
a variety of transactions may make use of the "negotiable" instrument, variously
executed.
92. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-603, 3-804, applicable to conflicting
claims to ownership of an instrument.
93. The point is subject to debate, but a person taking through a thief evidently
may not be a holder in due course of his stolen bearer instrument The argument in
part rests on the requirement of "delivery," which is the "voluntary transfer of
possession." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(14). For further thought on this
subject, see White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 MICH. L. REV.
1315 (1967).
94. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-401, 3-402, 3-403. These rules, relating
to the creation of liability on instruments through signatures, will perhaps be replaced
by electronic authentication procedures, For example, a requirement could be imposed
that users of systems enter a personal identification code which would indicate the
capacity in which the transaction is made.
95. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-404. Electronic "forgeries" will be per-
fect. There will, however, be degrees of security within systems which may be difficult
to breach. For example, the "forger" may find a stolen plastic card of no use without
knowledge of a personal identification code.
96. As a result, the instrument may be lost, destroyed, or stolen.
97. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-118(b).
98. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-115.
99. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-504, 3-505.
100. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104(1) discloses which "writings" are
-'negotiable instruments" for purposes of Article 3.
101. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302.
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electronic funds transfer systems. Plastic cards used in retail systems,
for example, may vary in appearance to users so long as the card may
be read by the terminals, and payment through a home terminal may
occur without the use of any card or document whatever. In EFT
systems, therefore, the relevance of the "formal requisites of negoti-
ability" is questionable.
To take another instance where the applicability of present Code
provisions is drawn into question, Articles 3 and 4 provide for the
fact that checks may be lost, destroyed, or stolen. 10 2 The forged en-
dorsement of a thief, for example, will be inoperative, 10 3 and the drawer,
if he discovers the theft, may stop payment on the check.104 The clearest
analogy to the stolen or lost check in an electronic environment is loss
or theft of the plastic card by which accountholders initiate transactions.
Analysis of Code provisions, however, indicates that there may be need
for a dramatic difference in treatment for the two situations. Loss of a
plastic card is a potentially catastrophic occurrence to accountholders,
since the card may be the key to an entire bank balance. The check may
be as well, but the Code establishes an absolute liability of the bank
to pay according to the drawer's instructions, and only according to
his instructions, absent his negligence. 10 5 Drawers regularly release
possession of checks, and the Code guards the integrity of that in-
strument as it leaves the drawer's control. By contrast the plastic cards
are designed to remain in the accountholder's possession. Code sections
dealing with stop payment orders'0 6 appear to be the most appropriate
analog for dealing with the lost card situation, rather than Code pro-
visions dealing with lost instruments. 0 7 The stop payment provisions,
of course, may apply to situations where authentic instruments have
been issued by the drawer as well as to situations where the drawer's
signature has been forged.
Both the stop payment and lost instruments provisions erect a
regime of vigilance, with especially burdensome requirements imposed
on financial institutions, as if to induce accountholders to part with
their checks. For financial institutions accepting electronic payment
orders, formatting of the electronic transmission will determine the
identity of the user, not a signature card on file for comparison with
the drawer's signature on the check. Perhaps to fairly balance the in-
102. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-603, 3-804.
103. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-404.
104. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-403.
105. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-401(1), 3-404(1), 3-407(2), 3-407(3),
4-401, 3-406, 4-406.
106. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-303, 4-403.
107. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-603, 3-804.
[VOL. 35
19751 EFT - SURVEY
terests of accountholder and financial institution, rules could be con-
structed which permit the institution to charge the customer's account
where properly formatted messages are received, unless (1) the account-
holder gives notice of a lost card after the accountholder should rea-
sonably have discovered the card's disappearance (a mandatory stop
payment, as it were), or (2) an unauthorized debit is due to the bank's
failure to observe commercially reasonable security precautions, such as
a failure to adequately protect against wiretaps or to produce cards
whose encoded information is not easily reproduced. This latter sug-
gestion imposes system security requirements, but releases the insti-
tution from liability where the established level of security is breached.
In addition, the financial institution should be required to issue a
periodic statement of account so as to permit accountholders to dis-
cover unauthorized debits. The Code currently contains no such
mandatory statement requirement. 10
An alternative set of rules could follow present rules regarding
unauthorized use of credit cards,' 0 9 placing a maximum absolute lia-
bility for unauthorized use of the card. However, such rules would
require modification in the case where an electronic payment order
is given without use of the card, such as from the home telephone, or
where lines of communication are intercepted through wiretapping.
At all events, under the Code at present it is within the accountholder's
discretion to issue a stop payment order, and the bank bears absolute
liability to the accountholder for payment orders lacking authenticity.
These Code rules appear too harsh in an electronic environment in-
volving a card retained by the accountholder.
A final illustration of the uneasy fit of present Code provisions
with what promise to be the practices of EFT systems involves the
matter of payment. In an EFT system, funds can be transferred, and
payment thereby accomplished, instantaneously, rendering Code pro-
visions treating of conditionality of payment largely irrelevant.
The check is a conditional payment. The drawer engages that he
will pay the amount of the check to a holder or any indorser who
takes up the instrument,1 ' including, of course, the payee."' Though
seldom discussed, it is a serious question just how the drawer is to "pay"
the payee if not by check. Of course, the drawer can use legal
tender and thus pay his payee." 2 It is not just the drawer's en-
gagement that makes the check conditional payment. Code section
108. But cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406.
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970).
110. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-413(2).
111. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-202, 3-302(2).
112. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 451 (1970).
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3-413113 (setting forth that engagement) establishes, as it were, a
fall back position or negative statement of the proposition that the
check is conditional payment. That is, if the check is dishonored the
drawer's liability to pay the payee or other holders remains; somehow
the drawer must effect the payment.
The check is also conditional payment by reference to the under-
lying transaction out of which the payment arose. Wholly independent
of the drawer's engagement as stated in Code section 3-413, it can
be said that a check is a conditional payment if, upon dishonor of the
item by the bank, the liability to pay on the underlying transaction
remains. This is the rule of section 3-802.11' It is an interesting
feature of the two-fold nature of the contingent or conditional dis-
charge of obligations through use of checks that section 3-802(1) (b)
provides that "[ilf the instrument is dishonored action may be main-
tained on either the instrument or the obligation.""' 5 As further
developed below, it is not quite clear where this pronouncement leaves
the disappointed payee.
So the check is conditional payment which resurrects an obliga-
tion upon dishonor of the instrument. But the check is also a pay-
ment, since the rules relating to the conditional nature of the payment
would make no sense whatever if the parties dealing with the item
did not feel, in the successful, non-dishonored check payment trans-
action, that a payment had been effected. Curiously, while the Code
provides that a check is a payment in the sense that the underlying
obligation is discharged,116 there is no double-layering provision, com-
parable to section 3-413(2), which declares that the taking of a check
is a "payment" by the drawer. There are provisions, of course, which
authorize the debiting of a drawer's account by his bank when a check
is presented in the collection process," 7 and, similarly, the payee is
given "provisional credit" when checks are forwarded for collec-
tion. 8 Code section 4-213... states that the payee's bank becomes
"accountable for the item" when, speaking generally, the collection
process has been completed. This provision is the double-layering
counterpart to section 3-413 (2), but it is stated in terms of the liability
of an institution, not of a drawer. Conceivably, the Code could have
stated the properties of a check as a payment and as a conditional
113. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-413.
114. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-802.
115. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-802(1) (b).
116. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-802.
117. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-401.
118. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213(3).
119. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213.
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payment, solely in terms of the underlying transaction. Instead, obli-
gations to "pay" on an instrument if dishonored, and to be "account-
able" for an item, and to debit and "finally pay" an item are stated as
well. It is indeed passing strange that the quintessential "payment"
instrument, the check, is nowhere simply declared a "payment" when
honored by the drawee.
The relevance of these "payment" rules is questionable in an en-
vironment where technologies make it possible to transfer credits
among financial institutions and thus effect what users of the system
will regard as payment. When the paying party initiates a transfer
order that is processed "on line, real time," that is, instantaneously,
the drawer and drawee will be dealing in "good funds" because no
payment transaction is consummated which does not result in a credit
to the payee. The conditional liability of the drawer would, therefore,
fall away. Of course, for unsuccessful transactions the payee may still
be looking to the drawer or paying party for payment, but in these
cases it would not seem that the payments system compels a set of
rules which re-establish a liability conditionally discharged, such as
the rules of Code sections 3-413(2) and 3-802. The party entitled
to payment has simply not been paid at all, the abortive payment trans-
action being a nullity, like reaching into a wallet and finding it
empty. Even in the case of "offline" electronic payments, such as ACH
transactions, there would be no formal occasion for establishment of
the conditional payment liability. Although there is a delay between
the time the paying party initiates the payment order and the time the
payment information is received by the payee's financial institution,
because the paying party, rather than the party being paid, initiates
the funds information transfer flow, the dishonored, not sufficient-
funds transaction would not arise - every payment which the payee
receives is in "good funds." It may be postulated that any payments
system may function without a secondary liability of the party paying,
so long as the obligation to pay arising from the underlying transaction
survives the aborted payment transaction. Apparently, the secondary
liability of the drawer on check payments was viewed as essential to
the paper-based check payment system, although it is certainly con-
ceivable that a check payment system could operate without it. For
purposes of the present discussion it is sufficient to note that EFT
systems may function without the occasion for use of a secondary
liability similar to that stated in Code section 3-413 (2), because trans-
fers will be in "good funds."
But what of the "payment" aspects of checks? Certainly users
of an electronic payments system will regard themselves as having
1975]
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been "paid" when they, as payees, receive an appropriate credit to
their financial institution account, just as persons are today presum-
ably satisfied with an increase in their checking account balances even
though the balance represents only an unsecured, if usually federally
insured, credit given to the banking institution. The above analysis
of Code payment provisions indicates a need to clarify when a "final
payment" has occurred at the drawer's institution, and when, after
the payee's institution finally credits or is "accountable for" credits
transferred to it from the drawer's institution for the credit of the
payee's account, the payee has been "paid."
These problems serve only to illustrate the soundness of the
earlier quoted abjuration "to [make] . . . practical issues . . . turn
upon . . . actions of a tangible character ' 12 or, to put the matter
otherwise, to ask whether a proposed rule makes situational good
sense, and not to have the question of the applicability of Articles 3
and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code turn upon conceptual con-
siderations and loose analogy. A touchstone of the inquiry seems to
be the extent to which the Code's rules find their foundation in a
paper based system where people are looking at, writing upon, and
handling pieces of paper in paying one another.
A brooding presence hangs over the entire debate concerning
the choice of appropriate rules for the governance of electronic funds
transfers, even in the narrow area of Uniform Commercial Code
"applicability." A very substantial percentage of the nation's checks
are cleared through the facilities of the Federal Reserve System, 2'
which has established a network of regional check processing centers
to handle the volume of paper which each day flows through the sys-
tem. This flood of paper is truly enormous. The provisions of Regu-
lation J of the Federal Reserve System,122 issued pursuant to the initial
grant of authority over check clearing given the system upon its crea-
120. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-101, Comment. Several commentators have
noted provisions of Articles 3 and 4 which seem inapposite or in need of revision in
an electronic funds transfer environment. See, e.g., Dunne, The Checkless Society and
Articles 3 and 4, 24 Bus. LAW. 127 (1968) ; Odom, Alternatives to the Present Check
Collection System, 70 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1968); Penney, Articles 3 and 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LA. L. REV. 259 (1966). Even the redoubtable Mr.
Clarke has noted an "inapplicability" here and there. See Clarke, supra note 79,
at 113.
121. Nearly 10 billion checks written during 1973 were processed through the
Federal Reserve System. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 1973, at 286 (Table 9) (1974). A recent report estimates
that 27 billion checks were written in 1973. Arthur D. Little, Inc., An Assessment
of Less Cash/Less Check Technology, Feb. 1, 1974.
122. 12 C.F.R.§ 210 (1975).
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tion in 1913,123 control a substantial percentage of the nation's paper
based payments. As noted above, the Federal Reserve has recently
proposed to expand this check clearing authority to cover interregional
payments made by use of the Fedwire. This system permits payments
to be made among Federal Reserve Banks and among member banks
or other parties initiating payments. It seems clear that payments
made through use of Fedwire would be subject to the requirements of
federal, not state law. In effect, use of the system is conditioned upon
acceptance of federal requirements imposed by the system.
Taking this a step further, Article 4 makes plain that checks are
cleared, and the check payment system operated, through banks. These
financial institutions are permitted to offer checking services by virtue
of legislation which authorizes payment accounts.'24 If these powers
were removed, the current paper based check system would come to
an abrupt halt. Doubtless the economic forces that drive our pay-
ments system would soon bring to life another group of institutions
that would offer something like a payments system. Travel and
entertainment cards, such as the American Express Card, offer some-
thing very close to a payments system, as do ordinary credit cards,
for merchants regard themselves as paid at the time of purchase
through use of these cards. 125
The payments system is presently dependent upon authorizing
federal and state legislation that permits financial institutions to offer
the financial services from which the check springs. If, therefore, the
Comptroller of the Currency, as regulator of national banks, were to
issue a series of rules governing payments made through systems
established by national banks, including perhaps the point of sale situa-
tion, would the provisions of state law governing payments be dis-
placed? If federally chartered or even federally insured institutions are
offering financial services, may not the respective federal agencies issue
rules incidental to those services governing the relationship of the
accountholders and their institutions? At least as to the latter, the
Federal Reserve has already done as much. The accountholderls rela-
tionship is now subject to restrictions regulating his access to demand
or time deposits. 2 6
123. Federal Reserve Act, § 16, para. 14, 38 Stat. 268 (1913). The check clear-
ing power is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1970).
124. See discussion at Part I supra.
125. There is some evidence that consumers regard the credit card as the equivalent
of a check for payment purposes. See White, The Effect of Bank Credit Cards on
Household Financial Decisions, 1973 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of Wisconsin). I am indebted to Dr. Carl Gambs for bringing this study to my
attention.
126. See 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1975) (Regulation Q).
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The initial electronic funds transfer pilot project regulation of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 27 could be viewed as the first in a
series of extensions of authority by federal regulatory agencies over
the law governing payment transactions, with a resulting displace-
ment of state law. The federal financial institutions could become like
tar-baby: all parties wishing to pay or be paid through the system
are stuck to the federal system, since these questions will involve the
relationship between accountholders and their financial institutions.
As indicated in Part I, the case for federal control of EFT systems
is not clear-cut. In light of the immediately preceding arguments,
these doubts may not easily be overcome.
IV. PAYMENT AND CREDIT PURCHASES
An interesting feature of electronic funds transfer systems is that
they make it possible to pay for purchases through access to either
the purchaser's line of credit or the purchaser's account balance, for
example, a demand deposit. The same two choices are available to
purchasers today through use of credit cards or checks. The mechanics
of check purchases are familiar to the reader and need not be dis-
cussed. Part III considered the body of law that establishes that a pur-
chase by means of a check results in a payment to the seller. Some
aspects of the mechanics of credit card purchases are less widely known.
In a bank credit card purchase the buyer presents a plastic card
that serves as a means of identification. Merchants accepting credit
card purchases inquire of a central information center to determine
whether the proposed purchase is within the buyer's line of credit and
whether the card presented has been reported lost or stolen. Both
major bank credit card systems now provide, on a 24-hour, seven-
day-a-week basis, a credit authorization service to merchants, typically
by a simple telephone call. The credit card performs the physical func-
tion of making transfers at the sales counter of embossed account
numbers to credit slips. A day's credit slips are presented by the
merchant to a bank designated as one that will discount them. Upon
presentation of the slips to the bank the merchant will be paid, usually
through a credit to an account maintained by the merchant with the
bank. The bank, in turn, will forward the slips to a processing center
for routing to the bank that issued the card to the buyer and that
carries an account receivable on the buyer-cardholder. Each of the
two major bank credit cards has established separate facilities for
assembling, sorting, and routing of these credit slips to the card issuing
127. 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1975).
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bank, that is, the bank that extends the line of credit to the cardholder.
Payment to the merchant is final where the merchant determines at
the time of the transaction that the buyer is within his credit limit and
that the card has not been reported lost or stolen. A merchant not
receiving authorization for the transaction runs the risk of repurchas-
ing slips from its bank.
As noted in Part III, the complex body of rules contained in
Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as well as Regula-
tion J of the Federal Reserve System, 2 ' are applicable to the process-
ing of check payment transactions. Each step of the route of the
written check payment order has received close legal scrutiny from
state and federal authorities. In sharp relief, the credit card inter-
change systems, which make credit card purchases possible, are rela-
tively free of complex federal and state legislative schemes, and a
spirited legal debate has resulted from the gap in treatment.'29 This
lapse in legal attention is surprising in view of the volume of "credit
card" credit, to use the Federal Reserve classification, 0 which cur-
rently runs into the billions of dollars. With the significant exception
of the federal $50 limitation of liability for cardholders,' 3' the rules
allocating risks for processing credit card transactions have been
left to private agreement. 3 2
One may term the processing of payments, or perhaps purchase
transactions is a better term, whether by check or by credit card, a
financial delivery system. One may turn this delivery system around
and look end on at the "products" delivered through this system. The
check product has several distinctive features: (1) it is regarded as
freely available, not involving a privileged relationship with the finan-
cial institution; (2) costs of the service have not proved to be a signifi-
cant issue with users; and (3) funds available through the service
are subject to miscalculation or to kiting due to delays in processing
payments. The credit card product stands on different footing: (1)
it is not freely available, but depends upon the creditworthiness of
users; (2) credit costs have proved a troublesome subject, since there
are myriad ways for lenders to price credit services (which are, of
128. 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1975).
129. Comment, Bank Credit Cards - Contemporary Problems, 41 FORD. L. REV.
373 (1972), reviews the literature.
130. See, e.g., FED. REs. BuLL., Mar., 1975, at A 48.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970). A number of states have enacted similar legisla-
tion. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1747.10, 1747.20 (West 1973).
132. Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code also allows that its provisions
may be varied by private agreement, but the Article 4 rules, nevertheless, provide a
foundation for such agreements and may serve to provide rules for circumstances not
covered in the agreement. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103.
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course, far more substantial than are check transactions costs) ; and (3)
once authorized, a user may depend upon lenders to bill him for pur-
chases, but revolving credit lines permit payments to be extended.
The present legal treatment of these two products is dramatically
opposed to the legal treatment given the delivery system for those
products. The credit card product, credit for consumer purchases, is
subject to relatively strict legal control. The federal Truth in Lending
Act1 3 requires disclosure of credit costs. There are, as well, pricing
limitations in the form of usury laws also applicable to extensions of
credit. By contrast the check product, a payment, is largely free of
protective disclosure and legislative pricing schemes.' 3 4
On the face of it, this is an extraordinary state of affairs. Check
payments have little consumerist legal protection for the financial
service rendered, the payment, but a complex body of law governs the
delivery system, payment processing. Credit card purchases, by con-
trast, have far more consumer protective legislation for the financial
service rendered, revolving credit, but little legislation governs the
delivery system, the arrangements for processing credit slips, paying
merchants, and billing cardholders that make the credit card system
go.'35 Electronic funds transfer systems raise the question of why
these differences in legal treatment should continue to exist.
The differences in payment and revolving credit delivery systems
conceivably could vanish from an EFT system. Customers will be
able to buy goods with one plastic card and, at the time of the pur-
chase, designate whether the transaction is to result in a debit to the
customer's account or an extension from an existing line of credit. If
the existing distinctions in legal treatment of check payments and
credit card purchases are to be maintained, then it will be crucial to
determine whether a given transaction is a payment or a credit trans-
action. Two cases have examined this problem, at least inferentially,
but neither court directly confronted the question. In both cases the
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-65 (1970).
134. The author is unaware of any state or federal disclosure or pricing limita-
tions specifically applicable to check payments. The UCC does contain provisions
which may be regarded as consumer protective in orientation, though not dealing with
disclosure and pricing limitations, the stop payment power and prohibitions on dis-
claimers of good faith or ordinary care being the most prominent examples. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-403, 4-103. For a general discussion of user impacts
of EFT systems, see Shick, Some Impacts of Electronic Funds Transfers on Con-
szoner Transactions, in THE ECONOMICS OF A NATIONAL ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER
SYSTEM 165 (collection of papers presented at a conference sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, Oct., 1974).
135. A recently enacted Fair Credit Billing Act provides a number of rules for
billing procedures of cardholders. See Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 301-08 (1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1737-44).
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courts were presented with the question whether payment by the buyer
before or after receipt of goods determines when credit is extended.
On first glance one would assume that when one pays for goods before
their receipt a payment transaction is involved and, conversely, that
when one pays for goods sometime after their receipt one has been
extended credit. For some purposes, the case is not so simple.
In Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.," 6 the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the Federal Reserve's four installment
rule,'37 which requires compliance with Truth in Lending disclosure
provisions where goods and services are paid for in more than four
installments. In Mourning a buyer took magazine subscriptions which
were to run for sixty months, but which were to be paid for, under an
installment contract, within thirty months. The installment contract
did not recite the total purchase price of the five-year subscription, the
amount which remained unpaid after the initial remittance, and con-
tained no indication of a finance charge or service charge, matters as
to which disclosure could be required under the Act. 3 ' The purchaser
made the initial installment and then defaulted. The seller's threatened
suit resulted, doubtless to his surprise, in the initiation of suit by the
buyer seeking the statutory penalty 3 9 for failure to make required
credit disclosures. The Supreme Court sustained the buyer's position.
The Court examined in Mourning the Truth in Lending Act
and its legislative history, concluding that the four installment rule
was within the power of the Federal Reserve as the agency designated
by the Act to fashion rules to implement its provisions. 40 Even though
section 121 (a) of the Act only literally required disclosure where a
finance charge is imposed,1 4 1 the Court upheld the Federal Reserve's
rule, which is applicable to cases where no finance charge is imposed.
The Court reasoned, in part, that lenders could too easily avoid the
Act's protections by the simple expedient of not formally imposing a
136. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
137. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1975). Certain disclosures in advertisements are now
required when made in connection with consumer credit repayable in more than four
installments. See Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 401 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1744), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1661-65 (1970).
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (1970).
139. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 406-08 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1745-47),
contains recent amendments to the Act's penalty provisions.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1970). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1970). Recent
amendments have liberalized the requirement for application of the disclosure pro-
visions of the Act that there be a finance charge by codifying the four installment rule.
See Pub. L. No. 93495, §§ 303, 307(c) (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1737,
1744).
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finance charge. This was too glaring an exception to permit, and, per-
haps, the only precedential value of Mourning is the Court's deference
to the authority of the Federal Reserve to ferret out and determine
when credit has been extended for the purpose of preventing "circum-
vention or evasion" of the Act's provisions.
But Justice Powell, in dissent, was not prepared to follow the
majority. In stating his position he squarely faced the question of
when credit is extended. According to Justice Powell:
[A] transaction is commonly understood to involve credit when
one party receives value in exchange for his unconditional promise
to pay the other party for such value in the future. The mere fact
that a party obligates himself in a contract to pay for goods or
services in installments over a period of time does not render the
contract a credit transaction ... 142
In his view it is not the fact of payment in installments but of payment
after receipt of goods which creates the requisite credit.
Another recent case takes the opposite tack. Rootberg v. Ameri-
can Express Co., 4 ' a district court case decided shortly before Mourn-
ing, raised the possibility that payment after receipt of goods and
services does not constitute credit for purposes of the Truth in Lending
Act. In Rootberg a cardholder of the defendant purchased goods and
services while traveling abroad. By agreement with American Express
the customer was to make payment in full upon receipt of periodic
statements of charges. American Express derived its income from
discounting transaction slips presented to it by merchants and from
an annual fee charged cardholders and not from finance charges im-
posed on cardholders. In finding for American Express the court
found that it was not a "creditor" under the Truth in Lending Act
and that disclosures were not required. "[F] ull payment is due upon
presentation of the bill," the court declared, and the defendant did not,
within the language of the Act, regularly " 'arrange for the extension
of credit for which the payment of a finance charge is required.' ""'
From the buyer's point of view the results in Mourning and
Rootberg are strange, since payment before receipt of goods is credit
under Mourning, but no credit is found in Rootberg when payment is
made after receipt, precisely the reverse of what one would, naively
perhaps, expect. Certainly these results are unacceptable in an electronic
environment where, at the time of the transaction, the buyer selects the
142. 411 U.S. at 383-84.
143. 352 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
144. Id. at 951 (footnotes omitted), quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1970).
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time of payment, that is, the debiting of his account at the time of the
transaction or afterward (through repayments on credit extended).
Acceptable solutions for electronic funds transfers must be reached,
whether of the payment or credit variety. In fashioning rules for elec-
tronic funds transfers, whether for product, as is the case for Truth
in Lending disclosures, or for delivery systems, as is the case for the
processing and payment rules of the Uniform Commercial Code, one
certainly may question how appropriate uniform legal attention, if
not treatment, may be for both product and delivery systems. Should
credit funds transfers be exempt from process rules? Should payment
products be subject to disclosure and pricing limitations? If the hold-
ing of plastic cards were to occur on a "privileged" basis, as are bank
credit cards, reversing the assumption of ready availability existing
for paper checking accounts, is the case for closer legal scrutiny ad-
vanced? Surely these are questions which deserve attention.
V. SAFETY AND SECURITY PROBLEMS
Of the utmost concern in a paperless funds transfer system is the
possibility of fraud or theft on a pervasive scale. The potential for
abuse is hardly fanciful. A few years ago the Federal Reserve in a
letter to bank presidents warned:
Information recently received reveals that banks are being vic-
timized by .. .bogus wire transfers of funds ....
A recent situation involves an instance where a $2 million
wire transfer (with valid code) was sent from a bank on the Vest
Coast to a bank on the East Coast.1 45
A. The Bank Protection Act
Technological and administrative measures are one answer to the
problems of abuse practiced upon EFT systems. By developing ade-
quate safeguards, such as using elaborate encrypting devices, "security
kernels, ' 14 6 and monitoring and reporting techniques, it can be made
expensive and risky to enter the system. Statutory and regulatory law
will play a significant role as prophylactic measures are developed.
The Bank Protection Act of 1968,1'7 the principal legislation in this
145. [1966-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 95,572 (1972).
146. See Popek & Kline, Verifiable Secure Operating System Software, 43
AMERICAN FED. OF INFORMATION PROCESSING Soc. CONF. PROCEEDINGS, NAT'L Co3,t-
PuTER CONF. 145 (1974).
147. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1881-84 (1970).
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area,1 48 requires that the federal financial supervisory agencies pro-
mulgate rules establishing adequate security devices and procedures.
Whether the provisions of the Act cover off-premises electronic funds
transfer modules such as cash dispensing machines and communica-
tions devices of the sort used in the supermarket deposit-withdrawal
system is an important question.
The Act applies generally to federally regulated banks and savings
and loan associations, 149 and nothing in the language of the Act, or in
accompanying legislative reports or floor debate, makes reference to
electronic funds transfer systems of the types discussed here. Never-
theless, the federal supervisory agencies have jointly promulgated regu-
lations establishing security requirements for automatic tellers, 5 ' units
situated on chartered premises, in the bank lobby, or in an outside wall.
The Senate and House Reports permit the drawing of a few
lines concerning the proper extent of this legislation as applied to
various EFT systems. The Senate Report which accompanied the
Act'I recites three reasons for enactment of the legislation: (1) the
increasing financial losses resulting from burglaries, robberies, and the
like; (2) the expenses of investigating such crimes; and, most import-
antly, (3) deaths suffered by bank employees during bank holdups.
It is apparent that, except in unusual circumstances, crimes involving
automatic teller units will generally not involve the third problem,
though some risk of death or injury to an innocent person will exist
when these units are serviced. But note that employees and customers
are protected only where the malefactor seeks funds of the financial
institution. Such a policy is consistent with the bank robbery statute
and related provisions. 152 A person who has just received his cash
disbursement must look to state criminal sanctions to protect him from
violations of his person by those seeking to obtain cash in his posses-
sion. For the purpose of the Bank Protection Act, a sufficiently secure
automatic teller unit is satisfactory.
Matters are no less intriguing where non-bank personnel partici-
pate in offering services on non-bank premises. In the supermarket
remote deposit and withdrawal system, supermarket employees operate
148. At common law, bank officers, and presumably officers of other financial insti-
tutions, have a duty to safeguard funds in their custody. I MicHiE, BANKS AND
BANKING ch. 3, § 43 (1973).
149. 12 U.S.C. § 1882 (1970).
150. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 21, 216, 326, 563a (1975). Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 748 (1975)
(applicable to federally insured credit unions).
151. S. REp. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2530-41.
152. See text accompanying notes 159-60 infra. Note that the question of the
proper allocation of federal and state authority is again raised.
[VoL. 35
EFT - SURVEY
communications devices and deal in supermarket cash. Arguably,
the presence of the system would increase the amount of cash which
the supermarket must keep on hand in order to service customers
of the financial institution, though the cash on hand could in
fact, be reduced through use of the system and this increase could be
related to financial institution liability." 3 Assuming that the pres-
ence of the communications unit increases cash on hand requirements,
is the supermarket any different from the individual customer with
cash in his pocket after use of a cash dispensing machine? One may
argue that if the grocery store were robbed, an agreement with the
financial institution could stipulate that the loss fall on the supermarket
rather than on the financial institution, and therefore, no federal bank
robbery would have occurred. Whether robberies of retail locations
containing financial institution communications devices involve a federal
bank robbery is an interesting question which will doubtless receive
judicial or legislative resolution. The outcome will importantly affect
the degree of supervision of retail locations by federal bank regulators.
Presented, then, is the question of how far the regulatory agencies
may proceed in requiring the establishment of security devices and
procedures to protect cash in the hands of participants in or users of
EFT systems. Indeed, the supermarket system appears to be far
closer to the "true" EFT system, despite the intervention of cash, than
might at first be suspected, since under federal law the funds which
are the subject of a malefactor's greed appear to be there, hidden away
in accounting entries made at the financial institution, rather than at
the place where cash is dispensed to financial institution customers.
The same observation may be made regarding the paper check system,
a system which shifts bank balances to make payments. These new
systems may require, then, a refinement of the ambit of existing regu-
latory control over entities subject to their jurisdiction. It is clear
that electronic funds transfer systems do not neatly fit into the pres-
ent separation of retail financial transactions from federal banking
agency control.
B. Criminal Sanctions
The previous discussion has been predicated upon the fact that
the technological and administrative measures are taken, at least in
part, because the criminal justice system forbids the performance of
153. This could occur, for example, if customers who usually "cash" paychecks at
the supermarket instead deposit all or a portion of the paycheck in a financial institu-
tion through use of a remote deposit system.
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acts which it is the object of these technological measures to obstruct,
that neither federally required protective procedures nor federally im-
posed criminal sanctions may out-distance the other. Literature already
discusses some of the varieties of criminality that the introduction of
electronic data processing affords. 54 There are at least four areas where
the intervention of protective criminal law sanctions will be appropriate:
(1) unauthorized access to a customer's account by means of the theft
or reproduction of an access "key," such as the plastic card, given the
customer; (2) unauthorized access to accounts by personnel manning
access terminals, such as the store employees operating the super-
market remote deposit-withdrawal system; (3) unauthorized access
to communication lines between remote terminals and information
storage areas, such as a financial institution's central processing unit
(in short, wire-tapping); and (4) unauthorized access at the central
processing unit site by employees or outsiders.
The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act currently makes
criminal the use of "any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost,
stolen, or fraudulently obtained credit card."' 5 This prohibition, how-
ever, contemplates the use of an instrument to obtain goods or services
on credit and not the use of an instrument in a transaction which is
regarded as effecting a payment, or a deposit or withdrawal, from an
account maintained at a financial institution. A similar prohibition
applicable to non-credit transactions may be necessary.
For operators of EFT terminals it will be important to decide
whether they are "in" or "out" of the bank system for purposes of
the application of federal criminal sanctions against those who trifle
with federally regulated financial institutions, since federal law dis-
tinguishes between "insiders" and "outsiders." Sections 656 and 637
of Title 18, for example, make theft, embezzlement, and the like
criminal where the perpetrator is an officer, employee or is "an ...
agent . . .of, or connected in any capacity" with federally regulated
banks and savings and loan associations. 5' This "insider provision"
has been held to reach an employee of a corporation in which a bank
has an equity interest. 157  Cases defining "money," "funds," and
"credits" for purposes of insider crime will probably require revisita-
tion in attempting to apply the sanctions of these two sections to EFT
154. See generally D. Parker, S. Nycum, & S. Ofira, Computer Abuse, Nov.,
1973 (published by the Stanford Research Institute).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1970).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1970) ; 18 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
157. United States v. Edick, 432 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1970).
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systems. 5 ' It may be supposed that these provisions apply as well
to malefactions at the point of information storage, which may be, but
need not be, at a financial institution's central processing unit. By
parity of reasoning, "distributed information" systems, involving stor-
age of information at locations remote from the central processing unit,
would seemingly likewise find the protection of these provisions.
As an example of outsider crime, the bank robbery statute,1"9
which applies to federally regulated banks, savings and loan associa-
tions, and credit unions, applies to whoever forceably takes or takes
with intent to steal property, money, or anything of value of the
specified financial institutions. It seems, then, that where outsiders are
involved it will only be necessary to find the "tak[ing] . . . [of]
any . . . thing of value,"' 0 but for insiders the required connection
with the bank or savings and loan association will have to be shown.
Interception of communications between points in the system,
such as between the point of purchase and the central processing unit,
or the unauthorized entry of information between points might come
within the ambit of protections afforded by Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,161 although by indirec-
tion. One of the purposes of this legislation is to protect the privacy
of wire and oral communications. 162  Section 2511(1)(a) makes it
a federal crime to willfully intercept any wire or oral communication.' 68
"Intercept" is defined, in relevant part, as the "aural acquisition of the
contents of any wire . . . communication through the use of any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device.' 1 64 Since identifying and authoriz-
ing information will not be transmitted in a form understandable to
the human ear, it is questionable whether this prohibition on "aural"
acquisition can be overcome, even assuming only the "privacy" of
communications and not their unauthorized use or entry is all that
need be protected. By analogy the criminal sanctions imposed by sec-
tions 656, 657, and 2113 could, perhaps, be applied to interceptions
158. As to the meaning of "credits" within 18 U.S.C. § 656, see, e.g., Theobald
v. United States, 3 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1925); as to "funds," see, e.g., United States
v. Smith, 152 F. 542 (W.D. Ky. 1907).
There are, of course, other criminal prohibitions which may require modifica-
tion, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 471-509 (1970) (counterfeiting and forgery) and 18
U.S.C. § 1002 (1970) (false entries). This is obviously not an exhaustive listing.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970).
160. Id.
161. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
162. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2153.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (a) (1970).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970) (emphasis added).
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of wire communications with intent to commit larceny, and the like,
rather than placing reliance upon the Safe Streets Act, which looks to
the protection of privacy rather than to the protection of the integrity
of financial institution operations (for insiders) and the property en-
trusted to them (from unlawful access by outsiders). Finally, it does
not seem that protection of information storage areas presents any
unique problem not already discussed.
VI. AN ANTITRUST SOUNDING
For financial institutions the competitive implications of the de-
velopment of electronic funds transfer systems are the most troubling.
Indeed, as mentioned before, the competitive challenge of rival banking
institutions, and of the thrift industry to commercial banks, is the
primary stimulus to the growth of EFT systems. The purpose here
is to take a sounding of antitrust law to ascertain what, if any, special
considerations may be applicable to these systems. The threshold ques-
tion of the proper role of competition in the regulation of financial
institutions was apparently settled by the Supreme Court's famous
dictum in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank :165 "The fact
that banking is a highly regulated industry critical to the Nation's
welfare makes the play of competition not less important but more
so.))... Financial institutions such as banks and savings and loan asso-
ciations enjoy no general immunity from the antitrust laws by virtue
of their status as federally regulated institutions,"7 nor do they enjoy
a statutory exemption, despite certain instances where statutory lan-
guage seems to indicate one. 08
165. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
166. Id. at 372.
167. Left aside are questions of "workability" of regulatory restrictions consistent
with antitrust requirements under Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341
(1963), and the operation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in this context. For
discussion of primary jurisdiction, see generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 19.01-.09 (1958, Supp. 1970).
168. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), is applicable to mergers
and joint ventures. The language of section 7 plainly limits application of the section
with regard to asset acquisitions of corporations "subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission." Sections 5 and 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46 (1970), as originally enacted and as recently amended, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, § 201 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2545), contain a "bank"
exception. These two sections of the FTC Act proscribe unfair methods, acts, or prac-
tices in competition and impose reporting requirements, respectively. The Court in
Philadelphia National Bank dismissed this gap in section 7 coverage by reference t3
Congressional purpose and canons of construction. See 374 U.S. at 342-49. However,
section 12 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), applicable to false advertisements,
contains no "bank" exception. Banks are, therefore, "subject to the jurisdiction of the
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Such special EFT antitrust considerations as there appear to be
derive from two functional requirements of these systems: the neces-
sity for inter-institutional clearing, and the apparent limitation that at
each authorization end point in the systems there be only one terminal.
To review briefly the several operational settings of electronic funds
transfer services, there are (1) an automated clearing house, serving
as a switch that routes credit and debit funds information; (2) a
terminal in a retail establishment used to make payments at the point
of purchase or to effect deposits or withdrawals (without payments
occurring) ; (3) a terminal in the customer's home used to make pay-
ments to creditors via telephone; and (4) an automated teller or cash
dispensing machine installed on the premises of a financial institution
or in a shopping mall, a factory, or an office building.
It will be useful to dwell briefly on the manner in which these
EFT services are delivered. As already noted, an automated clearing
house is both an apparatus and an institutional arrangement. 169 The
apparatus is a switch that routes information from one location to
another. This switch may be operated by one institution or by many
and may service any number of financial institutions. The nation-
wide Fedwire is an example of an automated clearing house operated
by one institution, the Federal Reserve System, but serving all banks
which are members of the Federal Reserve System. Automated clear-
ing houses have also been established at the regional level by groups
of banks, 170 and serve both members and non-members of the clear-
ing house. Finally, financial institutions and "service bureaus" may
provide data processing services to one or more financial institutions
and may similarly have a switching function. All three types of "switch-
ing" apparatus may form a foundation for inter-institutional clearing
of payment transactions.
Federal Trade Commission" at least to this extent. To complicate matters further,
section 12 of the FTC Act makes false advertisements unfair or deceptive acts under
section 5. 15 U.S.C. § 52(b) (1970). Philadelphia National Bank, of course, did not
find the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970), to have created a statu-
tory exemption from section 7 of the Clayton Act.
There are other troublesome provisions relating to banking exemption from
the antitrust laws. Section 106(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments
of 1970, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1972 (Supp. 1975), expressly prohibits a bank from tie-ins of
certain bank services, including extensions of credit, but grants the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System power to make exceptions from this prohibition.
On the question of application of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970),
to banking services, cf. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495 (1969).
169. See text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
170. See text following note 7 supra.
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The retail and home terminals and automated tellers may or may
not be end points for an inter-institutional clearing switch. Retail de-
posit and withdrawal transactions, which involve clearing with a retail
balance maintained at the accountholder's financial institution, need not
involve any inter-institutional clearing whatever. Early remote service
units established by federal associations under a FHLBB regulation.7
involve only this limited, intra-institutional retailer-accountholder clear-
ing. The "automated teller" serves currently as a deposit-withdrawal
facility involving no inter-institutional settlement. It is the assump-
tion of the financial industry that for each service location, retail,
home, or automated teller, there may be only one terminal, since
owners of the locations at which these will be located will not tolerate
row upon row of terminals, one for each financial institution.
It should be evident that a competitive advantage may accrue to
financial institutions operating an automated clearing house through
simple denial of access to a switch, or granting access only at pro-
hibitive cost. Of course, ouster from a switch may or may not prove
a competitive disadvantage; conceivably an ousted group of financial
institutions could establish a rival switch and clearing arrangement
and encourage as many customers as possible to bank with the ousted
institutions. That several varieties of switching facilities currently
exist argues that just such a development is possible.
The competitive impact of an automated clearing mechanism will
vary not only with the number and size of the institutions clearing
through an apparatus (and the account balances held by those institu-
tions), but also with the number and location of end points. Retail
terminal development (with retail account balances at the institution
establishing the end point), whether for deposit, withdrawal, or pay-
ment of the retailer, may provide a significant competitive advantage
quite apart from the clearing network. The home terminal lies in an
analytical position between the automated clearing house and the retail
terminal, since the home user will wish to pay a number of payees, who
may or may not bank at the same institution at which the individual
having the home unit maintains an account. The home unit, there-
fore, may be dependent for its competitive advantage upon member-
ship of the financial institution in a clearing network.
At this time the competitive impact of the twofold requirements
of EFT systems (as currently understood), the necessity for clearing
and for limited end points, is quite speculative. That different con-
figurations of EFT services may have quite different competitive
significance is evident. In expressing its views on the antitrust im-
171. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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plications of EFT systems, the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice has assumed that the regional bank operated clearing house
may constitute an essential facility.1 2 This assumption bears analysis.
The essential facility doctrine, as derived from Associated Press v.
United States17 and other cases, is a theory of encasement which
grants access to a venture by business entities harmed by their ex-
clusion from it.
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association174 is an early
instance of the application of the essential facility doctrine.175 In that
case an association of railroads formed a terminal company which
acquired control of the sole means of railroad transport across the
Mississippi River at points near St. Louis. Prior to acquisition, the
two bridges and a ferry service had been separately owned. Accord-
ing to the Court, the geographical and topographical situation of St.
Louis was such as to make it
as a practical matter, impossible for any railroad company to pass
through, or even enter St. Louis, so as to be within reach of its
industries or commerce, without using the facilities entirely con-
trolled by the Terminal Company ...
The physical conditions which compel the use of the com-
bined system by every road which desires to cross the river . . .
is the factor which gives greatest color to the unlawfulness of
the combination as now controlled and operated. 7 6
The Court went on to recite a number of offensive provisions in the
agreement establishing the terminal company - access conditioned
upon unanimous consent of the ten owners of the company, an obli-
gation among the parties to use only the facilities of the terminal
company, pricing practices, and other matters. The Court ordered the
defendants to revise their agreements in accordance with a principle
172. See, e.g., Statement of Donald I. Baker, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, Hearings on H.R. 11221
Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 150-69 (1973).
173. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
174. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
175. It is here assumed without discussion that the "essential facility" doctrine is
a distinct antitrust analytical category, such as "joint venture" analysis seems to be
after United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). See Pitofsky,
Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Signifiance of
Penn-Olin, 82 HARv. L. Rsv. 1007 (1969).
The "essential facility" doctrine is also sometimes described as a "bottleneck"
theory. See, e.g., A.D. NEALE, THE ANTrRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 66-68 (2d ed. 1970).
176. 224 U.S. at 397-98.
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of equal access upon reasonable terms. Failing such renegotiated
agreement, the Court declared its intention to "make such order and
decree for the complete disjoinder of the three [terminal] systems,
and their future operation as independent systems."' 77 The company's
practices were found to be both an illegal restraint of trade under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act and an attempt to monopolize under section
2.171 In reaching its decision the Court took care to observe that the
combination before it would not, of itself, have been unlawful "if it
were what is claimed for it, a proper terminal association acting as the
impartial agent of every line which is under compulsion to use its
instrumentalities.' 1 7
9
In Associated Press the government successfully asserted, inter
alia, that by-laws of Associated Press, which prohibited members from
selling news to non-members, required members to furnish their news
to AP to the exclusion of non-members, and granted members powers
to block admission to AP by competing publishers, violated sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act as illegal restraints of trade and attempts to
monopolize. The Court enjoined the defendants from observing the
restrictions on admission to AP membership and temporarily enjoined
the prohibitions on use of AP news by non-members and on furnish-
ing news to non-members until the offending membership admission
practices were cured.
The essential facility doctrine, as derived from these cases, has at
least two significant aspects. First, a violation of the Sherman Act
(as an illegal restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize) is made
out where control of a significant resource, for example, a news
gathering organization which " 'is a vast, intricately reticulated organi-
zation, the largest of its kind, gathering news from all over the world,
the chief single source of news for the American press, universally
agreed to be of great [sic] consequence,' '0 is coupled with exclu-
sionary practices having the effect of restraining competition. Secondly,
the relief granted in such cases is to order the offending parties to
devise rules of non-discriminatory access to the facility, failing which
more severe relief, such as dissolution of the facility, may be imposed.
Electronic funds transfer systems are candidates for essential
facility treatment, and the same could be said of the present paper
based check clearing system. Under the paper based check clearing
177. Id. at 412.
178. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
179. 224 U.S. at 410.
180. 326 U.S. at 18, quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
373 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.).
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system, access to drawers' balances by all who come forward to the
drawee bank has been assumed. Indeed, it is the duty of the drawee
bank to pay checks properly presented, whoever the payee or holder
and wherever he may bank.'" 1 If a number of banks operated a clear-
ing system for paper checks and denied access to balances to outside
banks, a case could be made for essential facility treatment. Local
clearing house associations now processing paper checks are essential
facilities, and were a clearing house to deny access to some of the
banks in a given locality, a court might well order that the barred
banks be given access. In theory each payee's bank could individually
present the payee's check to the drawee bank, check-by-check, institu-
tion-by-institution. In theory, too, (questions of the requirements of
state law aside) a drawee bank could refuse to honor checks presented
by certain banks, whether the check had been processed through a
local clearing house association or not. But a drawee bank is unlikely
to do this because to do so diminishes the value of the account to the
denying bank's customer, the drawer. The customer wants every
payee to be able to access the account. The commercial bank demand
deposit and the associated local clearing house association, then, make
a good case for application of the essential facility doctrine because (1)
by law the drawee bank must honor checks without distinction as to
identity of payee, holder, or depositary institution; (2) as a practical
matter each city may only support one clearing house; and (3) denial
of access to account balances will in all likelihood work a significant
competitive disadvantage on excluded banks.
The introduction of new technologies has made manifest the
competitive advantage of access, through clearing, to an institution's
balances. The nub of the debate over access to bank operated regional
automated clearing houses is not, however, access to the clearing house
facilities, as the Department of Justice seems to maintain, since
regional facilities can be duplicated easily at present volumes. The
question is rather access to the balances of those institutions which
are presently operating a payments system, the commercial banks. It
is access to the commercial bank demand deposit account which is the
essential facility rather than the regional bank operated automated
clearing house, because the present structure of the payments mech-
anism makes access to these balances a prerequisite to a payments
mechanism, a self-contained apparatus and underlying institutional
structure for the exchange of liabilities between drawee and depositary
(the payee's) bank. If an employee's financial institution may not
receive an employer's payment through an ACH, it is as though the
181. See UNIFORM COMMERCiAL CODE § 4-402.
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employee's institution were barred from presenting a check to the em-
ployer's bank for payment, if the ACH is the only practical means of
access to the employer's account. Similarly, the financial institution's
customer must be able to pay any designated party, wherever that
party banks, or the customer's bank suffers a significant competitive
disadvantage, at least compared to the check payment system.
If a strong case exists for declaring the institutional balance an
essential facility, a weaker case is made for regional automated clear-
ing houses. There are in-place facilities which could act as competing
switches, and a given community may be able to support several, as
they do at present. Further, so long as a financial institution and its
customers have access to the balances of other institutions, whether
that access be gained through Fedwire, a regional bank operated auto-
mated clearing house, or a service bureau, denial of access to one
clearing mechanism need not impose a competitive restraint. More-
over, too early a declaration that a switch constitutes an essential
facility may prove a disincentive to the development of competitive
clearing networks.
The retail terminal will have significance to customers as a con-
venient location for deposits and withdrawals and as a location where
payments may be made to the retailer. To be sure, a financial institu-
tion may obtain a competitive advantage by establishing retail terminal
locations, but this advantage need not have as significant a competi-
tive impact as denial of access to account balances, or denial of clear-
ing of all items originating at a given institution (to all balances at
the denying bank) since access may be had through the clearing pro-
cess. Moreover, other means of payment by customers not banking
at the institution installing the retail terminal, and other locations for
deposits or withdrawals for non-customers of that banking institutioq,
are possible. In sum, a less compelling case for essential facility treat-
ment is made for the retail terminal. Still weaker is the case for the
automated teller functioning as a deposit and withdrawal facility
where any number of sites may provide locational convenience for
customers of financial institutions denied access to an established
automated teller. Finally, the home unit makes the least compelling
case for essential facility treatment, since it will be access to the cus-
tomer's balance rather that the home unit which will be of importance
to competing financial institutions. Such at least are the conclusions
to which the two-fold assumption concerning the functional require-
ments of EFT systems appears to lead.
As previously discussed in Part I concerning federal control over
EFT systems through branching and payment powers limitations, the
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Court in the Dickinson case'8 2 broadly interpreted section 36(f) of the
National Bank Act to include considerations of competitive advantage.
If, as the Court said in Philadelphia National Bank, "the play of com-
petition [is] not less important but more so"'" in the field of regulated
financial institutions, then the gloss placed on a section 36(f) branch
may be in need of reexamination. The Court assumed in Dickinson
that a competitive advantage would accrue to a national bank offering
remote deposit facilities. It might be more appropriate to provide
state chartered institutions with an opportunity to respond to a com-
petitive advantage given a national bank through establishment of new
facilities rather than to blunt the competitive challenge posed by the
national bank at the outset. State banks are conceivably capable of
offering other services which would offset the competitive advantage
posed by the new facility. Actions by national banks may prompt
state regulatory authorities to reconsider the legality of proposed serv-
ices under existing regulations and statutes, or the state legislature
may be encouraged to alter the underlying statutory scheme. If the
judgment of state authorities is that the state banks are not to be per-
mitted to engage in the activity, even after the national bank shows
the existence of a market for the service offered, only then should
the Court declare the facility to be outside the authority of national
banks as an impermissible disturbance of the principle of "competitive
equality" of section 36 (c) as interpreted in Walker Bank & Trust.
The result of the Dickinson holding is to give the competitive initiative
to state chartered institutions to the exclusion of national banks. The
principle of competitive equality does not seem to command such a
result, especially in the absence of a proven showing of competitive
advantage for national banks.
VII. PRIVACY
The literature on the protection of citizen privacy is enormous,
the outstanding general academic contributions being books by Miller
and by Westin and Baker.8 4  A good deal of activity has recently
taken place at the federal level, including a study by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare on computers and the right of
182. Dickinson is discussed at text accompanying notes 34-42 supra.
183. 374 U.S. at 372.
184. A.R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND
DossIERs (1972); A.F. WESTIN & M.A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1972).
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privacy with suggestions for a code of fair information practices, S8
issuance of recommendations for the protection of citizen privacy by the
President's Domestic Council Committee on the Right of Privacy,"8 '
and the enactment of legislation governing access to government held
information and creating a two-year Privacy Protection Study Com-
mission.18 7 A principal conclusion of the HEW study was that
application of computers to record keeping has challenged tra-
ditional constraints on record keeping practices. The computer
enables organizations to enlarge their data-processing capacity sub-
stantially, while greatly facilitating access to recorded data ....'s8
Simply put, computer technology makes it vastly easier to gather,
store, and retrieve information. The difference as compared to tra-
ditional quill and paper records may be so great as to make the differ-
ence one of kind and not of degree. Computer technology means more
information will be kept and more information will be retrieved,
simply because both tasks will be far less burdensome.
No attempt will be made here to exhaustively treat the law of
the privacy of bank records. There is some case law to the effect
that there is an implied condition in the agreement between bank
and customer that information confidentially held will not be dis-
closed.1 8 9 A recent United States Supreme Court decision import-
antly affects the privacy of financial records maintained by financial
institutions. California Bankers Association v. Schultz' 90 is a case
testing the constitutionality of the reporting and record keeping re-
quirements imposed by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.' To assist
the government in its law enforcement activities, especially with re-
spect to the activities of organized crime and the maintenance of "secret
Swiss bank accounts," the Act requires "the maintenance of records,
and the making of certain reports, which 'have a high degree of useful-
185. HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS: REcoRDs, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS passim
(1973) [hereinafter cited as REcoRDs, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS].
186. See Press Release, Domestic Council Committee on the Right of Privacy,
July 10, 1974.
187. Pub. L. No. 93-579 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2177-94).
188. REcoRDs, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 185, at xix.
189. See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284
(1961). Cf. Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969).
190. 416 U.S. 21 (1974), aff'g in part and rev'g in part Stark v. Connally, 347
F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
191. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified in various sections of 12 and
31 U.S.C.).
[VOL. 35
EFT - SURVEY
ness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.' "192
In addition, financial transactions are to be reported to the govern-
ment by individuals as well as by financial institutions. 9 3 The Secre-
tary of the Treasury is empowered to issue regulations implementing
the Act's provisions,'1 94 and has done so.'9 5 In short, the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970 is a broad charter for the required preservation by finan-
cial institutions of the nation's financial transactions and their dis-
closure to government officials.
A bank, bank customers, a banking trade organization, and a civil
liberties group challenged the constitutionality of the Act's require-
ments. A three judge court upheld its record keeping requirements,
but struck down the reporting requirements applicable to domestic
financial transactions as an unreasonable search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.'9 6 On appeal to the Supreme Court the con-
stitutionality of the Act and of regulations issued thereunder were
upheld in their entirety. The essential thrust of the opinion was
three-fold. First, record keeping and reporting requirements could be
imposed on both financial institutions and individuals as a permissible
means for Congress to prohibit criminal trafficking in negotiable in-
struments moving through interstate and foreign commerce. Secondly,
while "there is no denying the impressive sweep of the authority con-
ferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury,"' 9 7 the existing require-
ments were reasonable in their scope. Thirdly, as to any disclosure
in addition to the present reporting requirements, protections against
improper disclosure would be found in the Congressional intent, but
not in any express statutory language, that "access to records is to be
controlled by existing legal process."' 98 The Court thus left to an-
other day the question whether particular record keeping or reporting
requirements which might thereafter be imposed by the Secretary, or
particular requests by government authorities for recorded informa-
tion, could violate constitutional guarantees. In reaching its decision
the Court seemed unable to satisfactorily distinguish the record keep-
ing and reporting requirements already imposed as a result of the
federal taxation system, a system requiring every individual to report
192. 416 U.S. at 26, citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b(a) (2), 1951 (1970); 31 U.S.C.
§ 105 (1970).
193. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1082, 1101 (a), 1121(a) (1970).
194. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (1970).
195. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.11-.51 (1974).
196. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
197. 416 U.S. at 30.
198. Id. at 52.
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financial transactions. 9 ' For the Court the Rubicon had long ago been
crossed by the passage of federal taxation legislation; the Bank Secrecy
Act simply provided a supplementary reporting system. Protection of
institutions and individuals would be left to particular case settings
yet to come, as with federal tax records. Yet the Court took special
pains to emphasize the requirement that access to information would
be governed by "existing legal process," a requirement, as already
noted, not expressly stated in the language of the Act.2"'
California Bankers Association v. Schultz is disturbing because
the Bank Secrecy Act, as upheld by the Court, seems to illustrate a
principal tenet of the HEW study - where information is kept it
will be sought. In effect the Bank Secrecy Act capitalizes upon the
record keeping potential of the banking system, even though those
records may be kept for reasons entirely foreign to the law enforce-
ment activities of the government. The further computerization of
bank records will only accelerate this tendency by making information
more readily available. It is clear that with modest effort the record
keeping and reporting requirements can be applied to electronic funds
transfer transactions to come. 20 1 Moreover, electronic funds transfer
systems will make it possible to secure great detail as to the place,
time, and character of financial transactions. Indeed, by taking full
advantage of burgeoning uniform product code grocery store scanners,
individual shopping lists down to the last can of peas may be available
for government inspection through electronic funds transfer purchases.
Such detail for purchase transactions is, of course, unavailable where
purchases are by means of paper checks.
There are two troubling aspects to this implosion of financial
transactions into computer memory banks. On the one hand, the
privacy issue is usually treated as one concerned with the need to
protect confidential information because of the potential embarrass-
ment which disclosure would bring or because of the commercial value
of the confidentially held information. These values are important and
deserve protection at least on a par with the legal protection given torti-
199. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 6001.
200. United States v. Bisceglia, 95 S. Ct. 915 (1975), explores the "legal process"
requirement in the context of a "John Doe" summons issued by the Internal Revenue
Service.
201. As to record keeping, the Act requires maintenance of records "of each check,
draft, or similar instrument." 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1970). Reports are to be filed
respecting transactions "if they involve the payment, receipt, or transfer of United
States currency, or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may specify."
31 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970).
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ously induced emotional trauma20 2 or tortiously appropriated busi-
ness secrets.20 3
But of far greater concern is the potential for political control
which the recording of every financial transaction would bring. This
potential is all the more apparent where a law seeks to guarantee access
to that information by government officials. Under the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970, every financial transaction made through a financial in-
stitution is potentially subject to governmental superintendence where
records of such transactions "have a high degree of usefulness in crimi-
nal, tax, or regulatory investigations. 2 °4 As Justice Douglas observed
in California Bankers Association v. Schultz:
In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examin-
ing them the [government] agents get to know his doctors,
lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, religious
affiliation, educational interests, the papers and magazines he
reads, and so on ad infinitum. . . .[T]hese other items will en-
rich that storehouse and make it possible for a bureaucrat - by
pushing one button - to get in an instant the names of the 190
million Americans who are subversives or potential and likely
candidates. 2
0 5
Yet, if we are not to become a nation of Luddites, smashing the ma-
chines which relieve human beings of the labor associated with the
processing of billions of payment transactions occurring yearly, surely
there must be a practical middle ground or a series of accommodations
to the requirements of legitimate law enforcement activities and the
equally legitimate expectation of the privacy of one's financial trans-
actions. The majority in California Bankers Association v. Schultz
seems justified in its decision to await the context of particular requests
for information before deciding upon which side of the constitutional
scales a given request for information falls. The Privacy Protection
Study Commission may prove a valuable forum for the weighing of
these values in the context of particular problems and systems.
Mildly paranoic twentieth century man already wonders of the
extent of surveillance activities by his many and manifold govern-
ments. This is a fear more solidly founded than the fear of falling
elevators, another modern malady. A nationwide financial information
system, however beneficient in other respects, can be a significant
threat to our liberties, one requiring effective controls.
202. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 46, 312, 313, 436, 436A (1965).
203. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). Conceivably customer lists
obtainable through payment transactions with a merchant would be protected.
204. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (a) (2) (1970).
205. 416 U.S. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Electronic funds transfer systems will involve a number of players,
far more than have been previously recognized; there will be a greater
variety of financial institutions participating: banks, savings and loan
associations, mutual savings banks, and other exotica. Unregulated,
non-financial institutions will build upon their existing electronic data
processing capability to offer services much akin to funds transfer
services. Examples are the travel and entertainment card services and
major retailers who let credit purchases substitute for payments by cash
or by check. The development of an electronic funds transfer system,
then, is far more fluid and complex than has previously been recognized.
For the financial institutions, changes in payment patterns will
upset the current array of legislative controls over their competition
inter se and could fundamentally alter the present financial structure,
making it into one in which consumers play an increasingly important
role in the shaping of financial services.
The strained constructions of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform
Commercial Code should be abandoned. The law of paper transfers
should receive a quiet, decent burial, to be replaced by a body of law
based upon the practices of a new marketplace, one in which com-
munications issues will play a part. It may well be difficult to sharply
distinguish between payment and credit, and a new structure of pro-
tections, premised upon the degree of control which financial institu-
tions have over their users, may appear.
Enforcement of antitrust policy will play a central role in develop-
ing systems. Perhaps it has been uncritically assumed that, as a fait
accompli, "bottlenecks" and "essential facilities" will exist. Competi-
tive development of EFT systems should be more vigorously sought.
And finally, government must be sensitive to the potential for the
erosion of human dignity and freedom which a nationwide system of
financial communications could engender. Safeguards that do a credi-
table job of making those who police themselves subject to policing
by the public must be established.
